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Capital controls and intervention in the foreign exchange market are two controversial policy 
options that many countries have adopted in the past in order to influence the exchange rate and 
moderate capital flows. Colombia has a long record in the use of these policies with mixed 
results and often non negligible costs. The objective of this paper is to evaluate for the case of 
Colombia the effectiveness of capital controls and central bank intervention for depreciating the 
exchange rate, reducing its volatility, and moderating the exchange rate vulnerability to external 
shocks. The paper uses high frequency data from 1993 to 2010, and a GARCH model of the 
peso/US dollar exchange rate return. The main findings indicate that neither capital controls nor 
central bank intervention used separately were successful for depreciating the exchange rate. On 
the contrary, they augmented its volatility. Nonetheless, during the period 2008-2010 when both 
policies  were  used  simultaneously,  a  statistical  significant  effect  was  obtained  by  which the 
interaction of capital control and intervention in the foreign exchange market were effective to 
produce a daily average depreciation of the exchange rate, without increasing its volatility.  In 
addition, it  is  found that  the  fundamental  determinants  of  the daily  average  behavior  of the 
exchange rate return are its own past behavior, the risk in Emerging and Global Markets, the 
price of commodities and the misalignment of the real exchange rate.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The good performance of most emerging economies during the recent financial crisis and the 
beginning of recovery of the global economy, have revitalized international capital inflows to 
these economies. As a result, currencies in many emerging economies are again facing strong 
appreciation pressures. That phenomenon has been particularly acute in Colombia where the 
peso appreciated by more than 11% during the first nine months of 2010. A similar trend -
although not as severe- is also affecting other Latin American economies such as Brazil, Mexico, 
Chile and Peru, as well as many Asian economies.  
 
The impact that an excessive currency appreciation could have on tradable sectors has increased 
demands on governments and central banks to adopt policies to reverse this trend. Problems 
related with a massive surge of capital inflows and strong appreciations are well known. They 
have to do with deterioration of current account balances, the formation of asset price bubbles, 
excessive  foreign  indebtedness  and  increasing  financial  fragility,  that  could  put  at  risk  the 
incipient economic recovery of emerging economies. 
 
Facing  this  scenario,  economic  authorities  confront  the  dilemma  of  imposing  restrictions  on 
capital mobility and intervening in the foreign exchange market (forex) -aware of the distortions 
that this may cause-, or sticking to policies of free capital movements and floating exchange rate 
that have been so successful in the past for consolidating inflation targeting regimes. In principle, 
introducing  capital  controls  or  relying  on  forex  intervention  to  try  to  dampen  an  excessive 
exchange rate appreciation may be justified if the capital inflows that are behind it are perceived 
to  be  temporary.
1  That  can  be  the  case  if  it  is  assumed  that  developed  economies  should 
eventually start to raise interest rates to avoid inflationary pressures, once economic recovery has 
been achieved. 
 
In this paper we focus our attention on the effectiveness of capital controls and forex intervention 
to  attain  its  objective  of  moderating  an  exchange  rate  appreciation  trend  or  even  reverse  it. 
Assessing effectiveness is crucial, taking into account that these policies could cause significant 
efficiency and economic costs. From an institutional point of view, intervention in the foreign 
exchange market may weaken the inflation targeting scheme, by introducing the exchange rate as 
a secondary target, which could compete with the inflation rate as a primary target. Moreover, 
sterilization entails well known quasi-fiscal costs that, depending on interest rate differentials, 
could become quite significant. Costs related with capital controls of the type analyzed in this 
paper,  generally  results  from  the  distortions  that  this  policy  could  create  either  by  reducing 
competitiveness  of  the  financial  system,  by  becoming  an  obstacle  for  the  development  of 
domestic capital markets (as capital controls may discourage the development of domestic long-
term  financial  instruments),  or  by  reducing  risk  sharing  between  the  local  and  international 
capital markets. 
                                                 
1 Against this general principle, China and India have utilized capital controls despite that the conditions behind the 
appreciation pressure on their currencies are of a permanent character. 3 
 
Colombia has a wide experience in the use of both capital controls and intervention in the foreign 
exchange  market.  In  addition,  there  have  been  several  efforts  in  the  past  for  assessing  the 
effectiveness of these policies with differing conclusions. Regarding intervention in the foreign 
exchange market, it has been found that its effectiveness is at most short-lived and in many cases 
unable  to  modify  the  level  of  the  exchange  rate  (Appendix  A.1).  Furthermore,  it  has  been 
observed  that  in  some  instances,  intervention  increases  exchange  rate  volatility.  Regarding 
capital controls, the Colombian literature has found that in general they are able to reduce short-
term flows and induce a shift from short-term to long-term capital inflows (Appendix A.2). It has 
also been shown that capital controls used as a macroeconomic policy tool could help to increase 
autonomy of monetary policy by relaxing to some extent the dilemmas inherent to the impossible 
trinity (Villar and Rincón, 2003).
2  
 
In this paper we undertake a new effort for assessing effectiveness of both capital controls and 
foreign  exchange  intervention  for  the  case  of  Colombia,  taking  advantage  of  the  abundant 
literature on this issue and the availability of a detailed data base. This evaluation will be made 
based on the capacity of these policies for depreciating the exchange rate, reducing its volatility, 
and moderating the exchange rate vulnerability to external shocks during the last two decades. 
The results of this analysis may shed light on the dilemmas that policymakers in Colombia and 
elsewhere  are  currently  confronted  due  to  renewed  capital  inflows  and  exchange  rate 
appreciation. 
 
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. The second section offers a brief review of 
the Colombian experience with capital controls and forex intervention since the nineties. The 
third  shows  some  preliminary statistics  and  empirical  regularities  of  the  Colombian  nominal 
exchange rate (the peso/US dollar exchange rate) for the period under study. The fourth section 
presents the regression model and discusses its main characteristics. We use daily information 
for the entire period between 1993:01:04 and 2010:07:30 and four sub-samples (1993:01:04 - 
1999:09:30; 1999:10:01 - 2010:07:30; 2004:01:01 - 2010:07:30; 2008:01:01 - 2010:07:30), and a 
GARCH  model  of  the  peso/US  dollar  exchange  rate  return.  The  fifth  section  gives  some 
methodological notes on the variables used in the regression model. The sixth presents the results 
of the estimations. The last section summarizes the conclusions and draws the main lessons from 
the Colombian experience with capital controls and forex intervention. 
 
2.  A review of the Colombian experience with capital controls and forex intervention 
since 1990s 
 
2.1 Capital controls (a price-based regulation) 
 
Colombian started the elimination of administrative controls on foreign borrowing in February 
1992. The non-financial private sector was allowed to contract foreign loans for any purpose, 
provided they had a maturity longer than one year. However, by that time, the domestic financial 
system was not allowed to intermediate working-capital foreign loans. Later on, in September 
1993,  most  of  administrative  controls  were  lifted.  Financial  institutions  were  authorized  to 
intermediate  foreign  loans  and  restrictions  on  loans  maturity  and  final  use  of  resources  for 
                                                 
2 Excellent reviews of the international literature on capital controls or forex intervention are Sarno and Taylor 
(2001), Bank for International Settlements (2005), Edwards (2007), and Ostry et al. (2010). 4 
 
domestic residents were eliminated. Nonetheless, as up to date, domestic financial institutions 
cannot have foreign liabilities except for foreign-exchange-denominated lending with equal or 
shorter maturity.              
 
The  liberalization  of  foreign  lending  in  September  1993  was,  however,  accompanied  by  a 
compulsory unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) on short term loans different from trade 
financing, which remained on place up to April 2000. This deposit had the effects of a tax (a 
Tobin type of tax) on short term capital inflows.
3 Thus, the new capital control adopted by the 




Initially, in September 1993, only foreign loans with a shorter term than 18-month maturity were 
required to make the unremunerated deposit in the central bank. The amount of the deposit was 
equivalent to 47% of the foreign loan dollar-value and had to be kept during 12 months, or 
alternatively redeemed with a discount that reflected the opportunity cost of those resources. The 
URR was reduced to zero in April 2000, once the peso was let free to float. That decision took 
place  in  a  context  when  an  inflation  targeting  regime for  monetary  policy  was  adopted; the 
economy was recovering from the deepest recession in almost one century (GDP plunged -4.2% 
in 1999); and the country was experiencing a rapid drop in international reserves and strong 
pressures towards a currency devaluation.
5 During 1993-2000 both the foreign borrowing period, 
the time the deposit had to be maintained at the central bank, and the percentage of the URR 
changed broadly, even, at some point of time short-run foreign indebtedness became prohibitive 
(Appendix A.3 summarizes the central bank legislation on the reserve requirement since 1993). 
 
More  recently,  in  May  2007,  in  a  context  where  the  country  was  facing  a  rapid  currency 
appreciation and a surge in capital inflows, the central bank decided to activate capital controls 
by imposing an URR of 40% on both foreign borrowing and portfolio inflows of all maturities 
which had to be kept at the central bank during 6 months.
6 The URR was reduced to zero in 
October 2008 at the outset of the international financial crisis.            
 
2.2  Forex intervention 
 
Following the introduction of a floating exchange rate regime and the adoption of an inflation 
targeting  scheme  for  monetary  policy  in  1999,  the  Colombian  central  bank  put  in  place  in 
November  1999  an  option-based  foreign  exchange  intervention  mechanism  aimed  at 
                                                 
3 Strictly speaking it is not a Tobin (1978) tax because: i) It is not levied on all foreign exchange transactions, but on 
inflows, in particular on foreign debt inflows; ii) it depends on the maturity of the loans; (iii) it was not permanent; 
and iv) it has been applied only for Colombia and some other countries. 
  
4 Ocampo and Tovar (1997) have an excellent discussion on the rational that authorities have at that time for 
continuing with capital controls. 
     
5 A comprehensive analysis of the Colombian economy for the 90s is presented by Villar and Rincon (2003). 
 
6 As a prudential measure, between December 2004 and June 2006, authorities reintroduced controls on portfolio 
inflows of nonresidents which required one year as a minimum investment period. Also, on July 2007, they put in 
place thresholds on bank’s currency derivative positions. 5 
 
accumulating foreign  reserves and controlling the volatility of the exchange rate. Two  years 
later, the central bank extended the option-intervention mechanism to also include reduction of 
foreign reserves, thus making the option mechanism fully symmetrical. Later on, in September 
2004, facing an escalating appreciation of the currency, the central bank introduced direct and 
discretionary intervention operations, that were on place until May 2007. 
 
The main characteristic of the option mechanism is its transparency and reliance on an auction 
system. The intervention is carried out in an open manner and with rules that are publicly known. 
Options for accumulating (put options) or decreasing (call options) international reserves give 
the holder the right to sell (buy) foreign exchange to (from) the central bank. The amount of the 
options to be auctioned is set by the Board of Directors of the central bank at its own discretion. 
The  options  are  valid  between  the  first  and  the  last  working  day  of  the month immediately 
following the day of the option. Options for controlling volatility of the exchange rate (put or 
call) can be held by the central bank the same day that the nominal exchange rate deviates 5% 
from its last 20 working day moving average. This condition also applies for the exercise of the 
option within the following month of the day of the auction. Since its introduction, the amount of 
the auction for volatility purpose was set by the Board at US$ 180 million, which has not been 
modified. 
 
Discretionary interventions are not subject to any public known rule, but internally follow the 
directions  set  by  the  Board,  which  changes  over  time.  These  interventions  are  secret. 
Nonetheless, the amount of intervention is publicly disclosed the following month. For carrying 
out discretionary interventions, the central bank participates in the foreign exchange market as 
any other trader, secretly announcing its bids for buying (or rarely selling) foreign exchange. 
    
By mid-2008, the central bank introduced preannounced interventions as yet another intervention 
modality. In this case, the central bank publicly announce in advance both the amount of the 
daily intervention in the foreign exchange market, as well as the period in which it intends to do 
so. The intervention amount was set at US$ 20 million daily and started in June 2008, but was 
interrupted in October of that year, at the outset of the international financial crisis. That type of 
intervention was again carried out between March and June 2010, by purchasing US$ 20 million 
daily, which allowed the central bank to accumulate US$ 1600 million of additional international 
reserves. On  average preannounced interventions  amounted  to  1.7%  of  the  daily  size  of the 
Colombian  foreign  exchange  market.  In  September  2010,  in  the  context  of  a  mounting 
appreciation pressure, the central bank initiated a new round of preannounced interventions. The 
effectiveness of this type of intervention will be evaluated separately.   
 
3.  Empirical regularities of the Colombian nominal exchange rate and basic statistics
7  
 
We used daily information for the entire period between 1993:01:04 and 2010:07:30 on the 
nominal exchange rate of the Colombian peso with respect to the US dollar (E). Saturdays and 
Sundays,  days  on  which  there  are  no  transactions  in  the  foreign  exchange  market,  were 
eliminated from the sample for both the exchange rate and the rest of the variables described 
below. The exchange rate value for holidays was kept constant and equal to that of the previous 
                                                 
7  The  various  tests  that  were  implemented  and  the  estimations  were  made  using  the  7.20  version  of  RATS. 
Henceforth any result on diagnostic or specification tests not reported may be requested directly from the authors. 6 
 
working  day.
8  Once  these  adjustments  were  made,  the  total  sample  size  reached  4584 
observations (260 observations per year), which was the sample used in the calculations of the 
basic statistics and initial regressions. 
  
The Colombian peso depreciated until 2003. With some interruptions this was followed by a 
sustained appreciation trend which by mid-2008 took the exchange rate to levels similar to those 
seen by the end of the nineties. Then a pronounced depreciation took place during the first six 
months of the international financial crises, but since March 2009 the appreciation trend restarted 
(Figure 1). From the point of view of the nature of the time series, a non-stationary behavior of 
the exchange rate seems to be solved with the first difference in the series. This is corroborated 
below by using a unit root test. 
  
The return, that is the daily percentage variation of the exchange rate; the squared return, and its 
absolute value, show a variance (volatility) that changes over time but behaves in a similar way 
during particular periods of time, thus forming clusters: large/small shocks in the returns tend to 
be  followed  by  large/small  changes  in  the  same  variable  (Figure  1).  For  example,  the  high 
volatility that was seen towards the end of the nineties and the beginning of the 2000 decade, as 
well as that observed at the end of 2008 and during 2009 are clear. These episodes coincided 
with  periods  of  high  international  financial  turbulence.  In  contrast,  volatility  is  minimal  or 
moderate in the mid-nineties and in the middle of the 2001-2010 decade.  
 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the periods of greater volatility coincide with the periods of 
devaluation/appreciation  thus  creating  a  U-shaped  relationship.
9  Also  the  functions  of 
autocorrelation  and  partial  autocorrelation  of  the returns,  the  squared  returns,  and  returns  in 
absolute value have a hyperbolic drop instead of an exponential one which would indicate a high 
persistence in volatility (they are not shown here). In other words, the volatility of the returns 
behaves like a long memory process, as it is stated by Terasvirta (2008), something that could 
not be completely corroborated by the “short-range dependence” or “short memory” test in the 









                                                 
8 In the preliminary estimations we also adjusted the sample for the holidays in the United States and Colombia, 
giving them the same treatment as weekends, and the results did not change. 
  
9  This  empirical  regularity  should  be  interpreted  cautiously  here  since  we  are  not  controlling  for  possible 
simultaneity  between  the  mean  and  the  variance of  the  exchange  rate  return,  or  between  them  and the  policy 
decisions we are interested on. Such control is made in the estimations below.    
 
10 The calculated value of the statistic was 2.015, 1.678 and 1.851 for the returns, squared returns and the absolute 
value returns while the critical values of 1%, 5% and 10% of the statistic for the right tail are 2.098, 1.862 and 1.747 
(Ibid., Table II, page 1288), respectively. Therefore, the null hypothesis of a short memory process was not rejected 
at 1% and 5% level of significance.   7 
 





The descriptive statistics of the daily return show different facts to highlight (Table 1).  In the 
first  place,  the  mean  of  the  variable  is  positive,  which  indicates  a  tendency  towards  peso 
devaluation in the last eighteen years. Furthermore its size rises with the control on capital flows 
and foreign exchange intervention by the central bank. This indicates that both types of policies 
would  increase  the  devaluation  of  the  peso.  However,  this  would  be done  at  the cost  of  an 
increase in exchange rate volatility as shown by the behavior of the variance: a rise from 0.31 for 
the  total  sample  to  0.61  in  the  period  in  which  both  capital  controls  and  foreign  exchange 
intervention were present. This suggests that intervention policies might have generated a trade-
off between devaluation and volatility of the local currency. 
  
In turn, the skewness (asymmetry) of the return distribution rises with the capital control or forex 
intervention,  but  when  both  are  present,  it  falls  drastically  (from  0.20  to  0.03).  This  would 
indicate that the simultaneous use of both policies correct the biases of the return away from the 
mean, which is reflected in a more symmetrical distribution of the return. On the other hand, the 
kurtosis of the return distribution becomes greater with the capital control and lower with the 
intervention, while when both are used it declines slightly (from 14 to 13). In other words, it 
appears that the simultaneous intervention in the capital market and in the foreign exchange 



























































































































































































































































































































































































Returns in absolute value 8 
 





The  skewness and,  in particular, the  excess  of  kurtosis  of  the  distribution  and  the  volatility 
clustering indicates a fat tail distribution which would lead one to conclude that the returns on 
the exchange rate do not have a normal distribution. As a complement, we generated a histogram 
(not  shown  here)  of  the  distribution  of  the  return  frequencies  versus  those  of  a  normal 
distribution and obtained the same result –fatter tails and greater skewness than those in a normal 
distribution. These results are corroborated by the rejection of the normality assumption based on 
the Jarque-Bera test. 
 
Daily(5) Data From 1993:01:05 To 2010:07:30
Observations 4584 Skipped/Missing 0
Sample Mean 0.02 Variance 0.31
Standard Error 0.56 of Sample Mean 0.01
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.41 Signif Level 0.02
Skewness 0.20 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.00
Kurtosis (excess) 13.62 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.00
Jarque-Bera 35.46 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.00
Median 0.00
Daily(5) Data From 1993:01:05 To 2010:07:30
Observations 2109 Skipped/Missing 2475
Sample Mean 0.05 Variance 0.33
Standard Error 0.58 of Sample Mean 0.01
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.88 Signif Level 0.00
Skewness 0.28 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.00
Kurtosis (excess) 19.01 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.00
Jarque-Bera 31.79 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.00
Median 0.01
Daily(5) Data From 1993:01:05 To 2010:07:30
Observations 1257 Skipped/Missing 3327
Sample Mean 0.05 Variance 0.48
Standard Error 0.69 of Sample Mean 0.02
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.71 Signif Level 0.01
Skewness 0.26 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.00
Kurtosis (excess) 13.39 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.00
Jarque-Bera 9.41 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.00
Median 0.01
Daily(5) Data From 1993:01:05 To 2010:07:30
Observations 764 Skipped/Missing 3820
Sample Mean 0.12 Variance 0.61
Standard Error 0.78 of Sample Mean 0.03
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.37 Signif Level 0.00
Skewness 0.03 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.73
Kurtosis (excess) 12.63 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.00
Jarque-Bera 5.08 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.00
Median 0.09
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Complete sample
Períod in which the capital control was impossed
Períod in which forex intervention was used
Períod in which both the capital control and forex intervention were used9 
 
4.  The regression model  
 
The regression model which we start with is one from the family of GARCH models that allows 
us to simultaneously estimate the mean and variance of the return of the nominal exchange rate. 
The  stylized  facts  just  described,  the  data  frequency  used,  and  the  literature  reviewed 
categorically show that this is the most appropriate procedure for analyzing the mean and the 
variance  of financial  variables  such  as  the  exchange  rate  (Engle  et  al.,  1990; Andersen  and 
Bollerslev, 1998).   
 
The AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) regression model in logarithms for the mean of the short term return of 
the exchange rate, indexed by time t, is the following (the expected signs are in parenthesis): 
  
∆   =    +   ∆     +   ∆        +        +   ∆      +       
  +        +   ∆    +         
       (+)      (+)                 (+)        (-)             (+)     (+)      (-)       (-) 
 
+      
  ∗ ∆        +        
  ∗      +        
  ∗ ∆      +   
11	          (1) 
   (-)                    (+)            (+) 
 
where the dependent variable  e is the peso/US dollar exchange rate return [ et=(Ln Et-Ln Et-1) 
*100], the constant β0 represents the expected long term mean return and ut is the unexpected 
short  term  return,  that  is  initially  assumed  to  be  normally  distributed  i.i.d.  (identically  and 
independently) with a mean of zero and conditional h variance.
12 Later on, we will evaluate if the 
assumed  normality  and  independence  of  the  errors  is  supported  by  the  data.     is  the  first-
difference operator. β5 and β6, the coefficients we are mostly interested, measure the short-run 
effects on the mean return of the exchange rate of capital controls and central bank intervention 
in the foreign exchange market respectively.  We conclude that the  capital control and forex 
intervention were effective if they induced a daily average devaluation of the peso.
13,14  It is 
important  to  mention  that  we  choose  to  work  with  time  series  in  first  differences  because 
theoretically we are interested in evaluating the effects on the exchange rate return rather than on 
the level of the exchange rate; and empirically, because the non-stationary nature of the time 
series being used. 
                                                 
11 As is traditional in the literature where the exchange rate is studied and in order to compare with other results, we 
estimated a GARCH type model on the order of p=1 and q=1. This, however, is justified to model the data analyzed 
when we implement different specification tests. By simplicity, the autoregressive component m from equation (1) is 
shown to be equal to the unit. In the estimations, it took different values based on the tests that evaluate the structure 
of the return lags. This will be made explicit later on. 
 
12 In general, the equation (1) errors are shown in the standardized fashion:    =    ℎ , where z is simply the 
standardized error such that zt ~ N(0,1). 
 
13 This interpretation on the effectiveness of both policies not necessarily coincides with that of the central bank, 
which may be related with a change in the exchange-rate-level long trend. 
 
14  If these policies were effective they would increase the future spot exchange rate relative to the expected spot rate 
in such a way that would reduce the incentives for international capitals to come in. In terms of the uncovered 
interest parity hypothesis this implies that the yield of the local asset -measured in dollars- relative to the yield of the 
foreign asset would be reduced, thus discouraging capital inflows. 
  10 
 
 
The explanatory variables of the model are: i) spread: Measure the risk in the financial sector of 
Emerging Markets (EM); ii) vix: Measure the volatility (risk) in the financial markets of the 
industrialized countries; iii) Dif: The differential between the domestic rate and the foreign rate 
iv) TAX
j: The tax equivalent to the URR on capital inflows as a measure of the capital controls. 
This constitutes our first variable of interest (the index j indicates the alternative measurement of 
the TAX variable, as explained below; v)    : The instrumental variable that measures the central 
bank intervention in the foreign exchange market, which is our second variable of interest;
15 vi) 
pc: The commodity prices; vii) Dq: Measure the misalignment of the real exchange rate; and viii) 
the interaction variables TAX
i*∆spread, TAX
i*   , and TAX
i*∆Dif (in Appendix A.4 we provide a 
detailed description of the series used). The logarithmic exchange rate series, the logarithm of the 
spread, the interest differential and the logarithm of prices of commodities were differentiated 
once to obtain stationary series. 
 
The  lagged  dependent  variable  captures  the  possible  persistence  of  the  peso 
devaluation/appreciation; spread, the consequence on the exchange rate return of shocks to risk 
in EM: If the risk increases, the exchange rate return of the domestic currency should increase; 
vix, the effect of the perception of risk in the financial markets of the industrialized countries. 
According to the flight to quality hypothesis, if this type of risk increases, then capitals leave EM 
and depreciates their currencies; Dif, the influence of interest differential on capital movements 
(the so called carry trade effect): If this differential raises then capital inflows increase, putting 
pressure on the local currency to appreciate; TAX, the effect of the URR on restricting capital 
inflows and then reducing the appreciation pressures on the peso;    , the consequence of the 
central bank intervention in the forex market; pc, the effect of real flows due to variations on 
commodity prices, since Colombian mainly exports are those type of goods;
16 Dq is an error 
correction  mechanism  for  the  nominal  exchange  rate  towards  its  long-run  equilibrium  level: 
When Dq is positive in the current period the real exchange rate of the peso is undervalued, so 
that it is expected that the nominal rate appreciates in the next period. On the contrary, if the real 
exchange rate of the peso is overvalued it is expected that the nominal rate depreciates in the 
next period. The implicit assumption here is that the nominal and the equilibrium real exchange 
rate are cointegrated variables;
17 and finally, the three interaction variables, whose motivation 








                                                 
15  The  literature  has identified  at least three  channels through  which foreign  exchange  intervention  affects the 
exchange rate: signaling channel (Mussa, 1981), portfolio channel (Dooley and Isard, 1983), and the microstructure 
channel (Lyons, 2001). 
 
16 Exports of commodities represented around 55% of the total Colombian exports for the year 2009. 
 
17 This assumption could not be tested because the daily data of the determinants of the equilibrium real exchange 
rate was not available.  11 
 
The short term conditional variance or conditional volatility for the exchange rate return of the 
peso, indexed by time t, is given by (the expected signs are in parenthesis): 
 
ℎ  =    +      
  +  ℎ    +   |∆       | +       +   |∆     | +       
  +        +   |∆   |+ 
       (+)               (+)         (+)       (-)            (-)      (+) 
 
               
  ∗ ∆        +       
  ∗      +       
  ∗ ∆                       (2)            
        (-)                  (-)         (-) 
 
where α0 represents the long term conditional variance (α0 ≥ 0), h the conditional variance of the 
return (b ≥ 0), u
2 is the unexpected squared return (a ≥ 0). Note that h is stationary if and only if 
a + b < 1. The variables defined  above, some of which are introduced into equation (2) in 
absolute value, explain the changes with respect to the long term conditional variance α0. The 
coefficients we are interested on are α4 and α5, which measure, respectively, the effects of the 
capital  controls  and  forex  intervention  on  the  volatility  of the  peso/US  dollar exchange  rate 
return.  We  will  conclude  that  the  capital  control  was  effective  in  the  short  term  if  it  made 
possible to reduce the volatility of the return. As was argued by Eichengreen et al. (1995), capital 
controls constrain speculative inflows helping to stabilize the exchange rate and reducing its 
short term volatility, by throwing “sand in the wheels” to the capital flows. From a different 
perspective, Dominguez (1998) argues that if the signal that forex intervention provides on the 
future monetary policy stance is credible and unambiguous, and if the foreign exchange market 
is efficient, then an intervention should not have any influence on the volatility of the exchange 
rate. On this basis, we will conclude that the central bank intervention is effective if it reduces -
or at least do not increase- the daily average volatility of the return.
18  
 
The justification for including the ARCH component, which is the u
2 term, is that it gathers 
volatility by groups or clusters that are typical of the exchange rate return and of other financial 
variables,  as  it  was  shown  in  the  previous  section.  In  addition,  the  ARCH  term  helps  to 
incorporate  the  excess  of  kurtosis  of  the  return  distribution  into  the  variance  equation.  The 
lagged variance captures the assumption of its non-constancy over time (Bollerslev, 1986). 
  
5.  Some methodological notes on the variables 
 
Before continuing, it is necessary to make some methodological clarifications on the variables 
incorporated into the regression model which has similarities to those estimated by Edwards and 
Rigobon (2005) for the Chilean case and Clements and Kamil (2008) for Colombia.  
 
In the first place, the exchange rate was lagged one day since the value on t reported by the 
central bank corresponds to the actual value observed on t-1. 
 
The daily variation of the EMBI
+ (Emerging Markets Bond Index +) is used as the measurement 
of the spread to depict the foreign debt risk of Emerging Markets. In order to capture the external 
risk shocks exclusively, Colombia was excluded from the construction of this indicator.  
 
                                                 
18 Again, this interpretation of the effectiveness of both policies may not coincide with that of the central bank, 
which may be related with a lasting smoothing effect on the volatility of the exchange rate return. 12 
 
The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (vix) is used as the measurement of the 
risk in the international financial markets.   
 
We used two alternative measurements of the interest differential: the daily differential and the 
90-day one. The foreign rates are the overnight LIBOR and the 90-day LIBOR and the domestic 
ones are the daily interbank rate (TIB) and that of the 90-day deposits (CDT). The estimations 
reported below are carried out using the 90-day differential.   
 
The tax equivalent to the URR on capital inflows is calculated in three alternative ways. The first 
is simply a dummy variable that takes the value of one when there is capital control and zero in 
the other case (TAX
d). Notice that this measure does not capture changes in the intensity of the 
control, as the next two do. The second one utilizes the Ocampo and Tovar (1997) derivation 
which was complemented by Rincon (2000). In simple terms the tax equivalent that the URR 
imposes  on  economic  agents  that  borrow  abroad  has  two  components.  The  first  one  is  the 
financial cost itself of the foreign credit. The second one is the opportunity cost of the URR. 
Thus, the tax is simply the excessive relative cost caused by the URR. If there were no control, 
only the financial cost would exist. 
 
If we assume that tm is the time (in months) that an URR on foreign debt had to be kept in the 
central bank, then the present value of the cost of the URR per dollar borrowed (PVURR) is 
expressed as: 
 
      =  1 −  (1 +  ∆ ∈)/(1 +  )    	                         (3) 
 
where θ =1, when the URR was denominated in dollars (as was the case between September 
1993 and May 1997), and θ =0, when it was denominated in pesos (as was the case starting in 
May  1997).  E  is  the  nominal  exchange  rate  as  we  defined  it  before;  ∈  indicates 
devaluation/appreciation expectations for the peso; i is the pertinent, domestic, nominal interest 
rate. Notice that the PVURR is positively related with the interest rate and negatively related with 
the devaluation expectations: the higher i the bigger the cost of the URR, and the larger ∆ ∈ the 
smaller the cost of the URR. 
 
For implementing equation (3), we built two alternative measurements for the peso/US dollar 
exchange rate return expectations. The first consists of a simple average of k lags and k leads 
ahead  of  the  return,  a  measurement  we  justified  on  the  assumption  that  the  agents’  return 
expectations could have come from a linear combination of adaptive and rational expectations. 
The second measurement captures a rational behavior on the part of the agents. It consists of the 
fitted value of a model in first differences for the return -the dependent variable- calculated as the 
logarithmic difference between the exchange rate in period t and its moving average one year 
ahead, on explanatory variables that are lags of the logarithmic difference between the exchange 
rate in period t and the exchange rate one year before, of the spread of Colombian public debt 
and of the daily foreign-domestic interest differential. The estimations reported below are carried 
out using the latter measurement. 
 
Now, if the relevant nominal interest rate over a foreign loan requested by a Colombian agent is 
defined as the sum of the foreign interest rate i
f plus the spread of the public debt bonds, which it 13 
 
is assumed to reflect the country-risk for Colombia, i
* = i
f + spread, the loan period (in months) is 
referred to as tc and the percentage of the reserve requirement as ε, then the total cost of a foreign 
loan (z), including the cost of the URR, can be written as:  
 
  =   (1 +  ∗)(1 + ∆ ∈)    +  (     )(1 +  )   ( /  ) − 1               (4) 
 
Observe that the longer the maturity of the loan tc the smaller the cost z, which reflects the 
purpose of the URR to levy a higher cost on short-run loans than long-run ones.  
 
Starting with the PVURR equation and the cost equation (z), the tax equivalent of the URR for 
foreign debt (TAX
O-T-R) is found as:   
 
                 =  (1 +  )/ (1 +  ∗)(1 + ∆ ∈)  − 1                   (5) 
 
In practical terms, the value of the tax is calculated using the different values of tc and the 
respective  percentages  of  the  reserve  requirement  ε  established  by  the  central  bank,  the 
institution  that  is  authorized  to  establish  and  modify  the  control.  In  order  to  get  a  single 
measurement of the tax, we took a simple average for all of the tc values, that is, tc = 3, 6, 9, 12, 
18, 24, 36 and 60 months (Appendix A.5). 
 
Due  to  the  possible  endogeneity  between  the  exchange  rate  returns  and  the  measure  of  the 
expected devaluation created by construction with the TAX
O-T-R measurement, we calculated an 
alternative  version  of  the  tax  using  the  formulation  used  by  Cardenas  y  Barrera  (1997)  for 
evaluating the effectiveness of capital controls in the case of Colombia and De Gregorio et al. 
(2000) and Edwards and Rigobon (2005) for the Chilean case. According to these authors, the 
equivalent tax of the URR on capital inflows for tc months is given by (we changed the authors’ 
original notation simply to adjust it to the notation used in this document):   
 
                                                =
 
   
    
                             (6) 
 
where i
f is the foreign interest rate, which measures the opportunity cost of the URR. Just as in 
the previous case, the tax is calculated as an average on the basis of the different values of tc, tm 
and ε (Appendix A.6).
19 Under the tax definition given by equation (6), if tm is assumed constant 
and given, TAX
E-R is a decreasing function of tc so that the longer the loan term tc, the lower the 
equivalent tax imposed by the control. 
 
Now, the indicator of the central bank’s intervention in the forex market (I) is constructed as the 
relation between the daily net value of the intervention (purchases minus sales of dollars) and the 
average daily size of the market using a one month window (Appendix A.7). Due to the possible 
endogeneity between the mean and volatility of the exchange rate return and the intervention 
indicator  we  constructed  an  instrument  for  this  last  variable.  For  this  purpose  we  roughly 
followed the econometric approaches utilized by Guimaraes and Karacadag (2004) for the cases 
of Mexico and Turkey, Disyatat and Galati (2007) for the Czech Republic and Toro and Julio 
                                                 
19 The formulation assumes that the reserve requirement is always in local currency. 
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(2005) and Kamil (2008) for Colombia.  
 
The  instrument  for  forex  intervention  (   )  was  calculated  using  a  generalized  instrumental 
variable procedure. Thus, we estimate it as the fitted value of the following (random) reaction 
function of the central bank (the expected signs are in parenthesis):
20 
 
                              	   =    +        +   ∆    +           +                       (7) 
                    (+)        (-)            (-)   
 
Where   is a stochastic shock to the forex intervention policy which is assumed to behave white 
noise. The lagged I variable in equation (7) captures the possible intervention persistence; De, 
which we have labeled misalignment of the nominal exchange rate, seeks to capture the response 
of the authorities to deviations in the nominal “equilibrium” level of the exchange rate: If the 
exchange rate of the peso is above its level of “equilibrium,” the authorities are inclined to sell 
dollars and vice versa. Since the “equilibrium” exchange rate is a non-observable variable, we 
estimated  it  by  applying  the  Hodrick  and  Prescott  filter  over  the  logarithm  of  the  observed 
peso/US dollar exchange rate (the series were extended backward and forward before applying 
the filter to avoid the well-known problem of biases at the tails when this procedure is used). 
Then, the foreign exchange misalignment is simply measured as the residual of the difference 
between the observed value and the filtered value of the exchange rate. The last term in equation 
(7),  the  INFS  variable,  seeks  to  capture  the  inflationary  surprises  for  the  central  bank.  This 
variable is measured as the difference between the observed value of monthly inflation and the 
inflation target for the respective month (the monthly difference is kept constant for each month 
and the daily series are obtained using a moving average of one month window): If the surprise 
was positive in the t-1 period, that is, if the observed inflation was above the target during the 
previous period, the authorities would be expected to purchase fewer dollars in period t. 
 
The prices for nineteen commodities based on the Bloomberg Commodity Index CRB are used to 
account for the foreign exchange pressures coming from the current account. 
 
The misalignment of the real exchange rate (Dq) was calculated as the difference between the 
monthly  real  exchange  rate  taken  from  the  central  bank  statistics  (when  it  increases  it 
depreciates)  and  the  estimated  monthly  equilibrium  real  exchange  rate  made  by  the  Real 
Exchange Rate Team of the Economic Studies Department of the central bank. The latter is a 
simple average of four estimates of the equilibrium real exchange rate: i) The filtered value of 
the real exchange rate using the Hodrick and Prescott filter; ii) the fitted value of a structural 
VEC model of the real exchange rate on real variables such as net foreign assets, terms of trade 
and an indicator of the Colombian trade openness; iii) the fitted value of a VEC model of the real 
exchange rate on real variables such as net foreign assets, terms of trade, public expenditures and 
relative productivity between Colombia and USA; and iv) the estimated of the “fundamental 
equilibrium  exchange  rate”  according  to  the  methodology  developed  by  the  International 
Monetary Fund. The daily Dq series are obtained keeping constant the monthly data and using a 
moving average of one month window.  
 
Finally, in the estimation of the regression model given by equations (1) and (2), we included 
                                                 
20 In Colombia, the central bank is the foreign exchange authority. 15 
 
three interaction variables, firstly between the TAX
j variable and the spread (TAX
i*∆spread), in 
order  to  deduce  whether  or  not  the  capital  control  helped  to  isolate  the  domestic  foreign 
exchange market from the shocks in Emerging Markets. If the capital control was effective for 
this purpose, the coefficient of the interaction variable should be negative and significant in the 
equation of the mean and of the variance; secondly, between the TAX
j variable and the forex 
intervention variable (TAX
i*   ), to assess if the combination of the capital control and foreign 
exchange  intervention  had  an  impact  on  the  exchange  rate  return  beyond  each  policy  taken 
separately.  If the interaction of both policies were effective the resulting coefficient must be 
positive and statistically significant in the equation of the mean and negative and statistically 
significant in the equation of the variance, and thirdly, between the TAX
j variable and the interest 
rate differential Dif (TAX
i*∆Dif) to evaluate, in the spirit of Villar and Rincón (2003), whether 
the URR helped central bank to gain autonomy by allowing it “to increase the domestic interest 
rates… without simultaneously creating additional pressures towards the appreciation of the… 
exchange rate” (Ibid., page 375). If the capital control was effective in attaining this task, the 
coefficient of the interaction variable must be positive and statistically significant in the equation 
of the mean (and possibly negative in the equation of the variance). 
 
6.  The estimations 
 
In this section, we estimate the AR(m)-GARCH(1,1) model represented by equations (1) and (2) 
simultaneously where we assume for presentation that m=1. First of all, we carry out different 
diagnostic and specification tests and present the estimates for the entire sample 1993:01:04 - 
2010:07:30. Then, based on the results of the statistical tests we adjust the model and, present the 
results for four sub-samples (1993:01:04 - 1999:09:30; 1999:10:01 - 2010:07:30; 2004:01:01 - 
2010:07:30;  2008:01:01  -  2010:07:30).  The  first  two  subsamples  were  required  given  the 
changes of the monetary and foreign exchange regimes by the end of the nineties, which implied 
a structural change as supported by the statistical tests. The third subsample covers a period of a 
very active intervention policy when new forex intervention modalities and capital controls were 
utilized  in  a  context  of  changing  external  conditions  and  mounting  appreciation  pressures.  
Finally, the latest subsample is motivated by our own interest of assessing the effectiveness of 
preannounced  interventions.  As  will  be  seen,  the  model  that  adjusts  best  to  the  data  is  an 
integrated GARCH (IGARCH).  
 
6.1  Total sample: 1993:01:04 - 2010:07:30 
 
i.)  Diagnostic and specification tests 
 
First of all, we test if equation (7) is both well specified and all the instruments are valid using 
the Sargan test. According to the test, the variable representing the misalignment of the nominal 
exchange rate De is not valid (this was a common result along all estimations) so that we got rid 
of it and estimate the model using the constant, lagged I, and INFS as instruments for forex 
intervention. Then, we identified the structure of the lags for the autoregressive process of the 
return or, in other words, the m value of the AR process in equation (1), which, according to 
Akiake’s  information  criteria,  corrected  for  degrees  of  freedom  (called  CAIC  criterion),  and 
Schwarz’s  is  equal  to  1.  Afterward,  we  corroborated  the  presence  of  at  least  one  ARCH 
component in the data through the Engle test (1982).  16 
 
Secondly, and as shown by the preliminary statistics on the return, we found a fat tail distribution 
and  a  failure  to  fulfill  normality;  we  used  the  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test  to  evaluate  the 
distribution of the unexpected returns u of equation (1).  The tests reported that the distribution 
was neither normal nor t-student so that we used a function of generalized GED distribution 
(Generalized  Error  Distribution).
21  The  GED  distribution  was  also  used  by  Toro  and  Julio 
(2005), Castaño et al. (2008), and Echavarria et al. (2009), who also estimated models of the 
GARCH family for the Colombian peso exchange rate. 
  
Thirdly, we carried out tests for detecting the presence of non-linearities or asymmetries in the 
conditional variance given by equation (2). For those, we used the Engle and Ng test (1995) in 
the simplified version proposed by Frances and van Dijk (2000, equation (4.71), page 160) and 
did not find evidence in favor of that behavior.  
 
Finally, we evaluated the presence of serial correlation through the Ljung-Box Q statistic and 
rejected the  null  hypothesis  of  non-autocorrelation in  the  standardized  squared  errors  and  in 
absolute value for some lags at the 5% significance level but not at 10%. We should note that all 
of  the  estimations  of  equations  (1)  and  (2)  throughout  the  document  were  carried  out  for 
Maximum  Likelihood  using  the  BHHH  (Berndt,  Hall,  Hall  and  Hausman)  non-linear 
optimization method (Estima, 2007).  
 
The first estimates showed unexpected results. In the first place, a long term variance turned out 
to be negative, something that, by definition, cannot possibly happen. Secondly, the estimated 
coefficients a and b for equation (2) turned out to be larger than one, which could indicate that 
the conditional variance h is not stationary since the hypothesis that it is a long memory process 
was not completely corroborated by the test that was used. Note that the non-stationarity of peso 
volatility is not strange to the trend of the exchange rate for other currencies around the world as 
has been documented by Baillie, Bollerslev and Mikkelsen(1996) and Davidson (2004). In the 
Colombian case, Castaño et al. (2007) found a similar result. The implications of this finding is 
that volatility could become explosive and the standard GARCH model is non-stationary and, 
therefore, inappropriate for analyzing the data.
22  
 
Therefore, and based on the statistical findings, we use a AR(1)-IGARCH(1,1) model which 
imposes the a + b = 1 restriction on equation (2). Moreover, due to the results noted above, we 
imposed the restriction that the long term conditional variance is equal to zero (α0 = 0). Notice 
that under these two restrictions, Nelson (1990) showed that the IGARCH(1,1) model is “strictly 
stationary”  although  “non-stationary  in  covariance.”  Nevertheless, he  showed that  the  model 
could be consistently estimated by Maximum Likelihood. Castaño et. al. (Ibid.) also reported 
                                                 
21 It is said that a random variable (continuous) X is GED distributed if its probability density function has the 
following form:  (  ) =     (−
|  |
  ) /  2 ⁄     2
 
    Γ(1 +  /2)   , where the (positive) parameter υ defines the 
shape of the distribution (the fatness of the distribution tails), the (positive) parameter λ defines the scale and Γ is the 
Gamma function. Note that if υ (or shape parameter) is equal to the unit, one gets normal distribution as a special 
case. 
 
22 A comment we received is that a possible explanation for these findings is the use of data in first differences, as it 
is our interest, however we did not explore further on this hypothesis.   
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evidence in favor of the IGARCH model when it comes to modeling and predicting the volatility 
of the return on the exchange rate for the Colombian peso.
23  
 
ii.)  Estimations 
 
In this section, we show and discuss the results of the simultaneous estimation of the AR(1)-
IGARCH(1,1) model for the mean and variance of the exchange rate return given by equations 
(1) and (2). As will be common throughout the estimations, we estimated a regression for each 
calculation method of the tax equivalent to the deposit on foreign debt namely, when TAX
d is 
used, when the implementation of equation (5) (TAX
O-T-R) is used, and when equation (6) (TAX
E-
R)  is  employed.  In  addition,  for  each  definition  of  the  tax,  we  estimate  five  alternative 
specifications. The first regression model includes all the explanatory variables, but excludes the 
interaction variables; the second incorporates the TAX
i*spread interaction variable, the third the 
TAX
i*    interaction variable, the fourth the TAX
i*∆Dif interaction variable, and the fifth the whole 
set of explanatory variables (the least restricted model). Hence, at the end we will have fifteen 
estimates of equations (1) and (2) for each sample.    
 
The estimates indicate, in the first place, that the capital control is statistically non-significant in 
most of the cases and when it is significant, the average return on the exchange rate falls instead 
of increasing (Tables 2.1-2.3). As for the variance of the return, the control has no effect on it. 
The coefficient of the TAX
j*spread interaction variable turned out to be significant in most of the 
cases and with the expected sign. This would provide evidence to conclude that the control 
helped  to  stem  devaluation  pressures  and  reduce  the  volatility  of  the  exchange  rate  during 
episodes of external risk shocks, although regarding volatility its effect is almost nil. The TAX
i*    
and TAX
i*∆Dif interaction variables were non-significant in the mean and variance equations in 
most cases. When the former is statistically significant in the variance equation it increases the 
return volatility. The results for mean and variance of the exchange rate return do not coincided 
with those found by Edwards and Rigobon (2005) for the Chilean case, but they do with those of 
Clements and Kamil (2008) in the case of Colombia. However, our results did coincide with 
those of the former authors for the TAX
j*spread interaction variable.   
 
The foreign exchange intervention, in turn, turned out to be non-significant in all cases in the 
mean  return  equation.  In  other  words,  the  forex  intervention  has  not  helped  to  prevent  the 
appreciation/devaluation of the peso. However, it significantly raises volatility. The inability of 
intervention to affect the exchange rate return contradicts most of the findings of the Colombian 
literature (Appendix A.1). Nevertheless, this estimation coincides with previous research that 
also found that intervention increases volatility. As said above, the use of capital control and 
foreign  exchange  intervention  at  the  same  time  has  no  effect  on  the  mean  return  but  their 
simultaneous  presence  does  seem  to  increase  volatility.  The  latter  coincides  with  the  initial 





                                                 
23 They also used daily information on the exchange rate of the peso for their study and their sample covered the 
period between January 3, 2000 and July 31, 2006. 18 
 
Table 2.1 Effect of the capital control and forex intervention on the peso/US dollar 
exchange rate mean return and its volatility     
 
Definition of the tax: TAX
d 




Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig.
Equation for the mean of the return
Constant 0.004 0.48 0.003 0.34 0.004 0.47 0.005 0.51 0.003 0.30
 e t-1 0.170 12.83 *** 0.168 12.77 *** 0.171 12.89 *** 0.171 12.95 *** 0.168 12.77 ***
 spread t 0.003 2.41 ** 0.015 6.78 *** 0.003 2.51 ** 0.003 2.54 ** 0.015 6.77 ***
vix t 0.001 2.29 ** 0.001 2.45 *** 0.001 2.29 ** 0.001 2.27 ** 0.001 2.44 **
 Dif t -0.000 -0.32 -0.000 -0.54 -0.000 -0.38 -0.000 -0.97 -0.000 -1.19
TAX
d
t -0.031 -3.62 *** -0.029 -3.34 *** -0.031 -3.61 *** -0.032 -3.67 *** -0.029 -3.33 ***
-0.000 -0.87 -0.001 -0.99 -0.000 -0.32 -0.000 -0.80 -0.000 -0.22
 pc t -0.029 -6.84 *** -0.028 -6.47 *** -0.029 -6.79 *** -0.030 -7.07 *** -0.029 -6.72 ***
Dq t- 1 -0.003 -5.93 *** -0.003 -5.68 *** -0.003 -5.95 *** -0.003 -6.01 *** -0.003 -5.67 ***
TAX
d
t* spread t --- --- -0.017 -6.38 *** --- --- --- --- -0.017 -6.27 ***
TAX
d
t* --- --- --- --- -0.000 -0.04 --- --- -0.000 -0.21
TAX
d
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.002 1.90 * 0.002 2.25 **
Equation for the variance of the return
a 0.209 15.51 *** 0.211 15.42 *** 0.209 15.56 *** 0.208 15.45 *** 0.210 15.35 ***
b 0.791 58.82 *** 0.789 57.71 *** 0.791 58.75 *** 0.792 58.89 *** 0.790 57.77 ***
| spread t| 0.000 0.98 0.000 1.39 0.000 0.95 0.000 1.03 0.000 1.48
vix t 0.000 2.25 ** 0.000 2.34 ** 0.000 2.24 ** 0.000 2.24 ** 0.000 2.28 **
| Dif t| 0.000 2.50 ** 0.000 2.44 ** 0.000 2.51 ** 0.000 2.35 ** 0.000 2.28 **
TAX
d
t 0.001 0.97 0.000 0.34 0.001 0.94 0.000 0.85 0.000 0.15
0.000 2.82 *** 0.000 2.77 *** 0.000 0.47 0.000 2.55 ** 0.000 0.35
| pc t| -0.001 -0.94 -0.001 -1.16 -0.001 -0.81 -0.001 -0.89 -0.001 -0.97
TAX
d
t* spread t --- --- -0.001 -1.78 * --- --- --- --- -0.001 -1.85 *
TAX
d
t* --- --- --- --- 0.000 0.45 --- --- 0.000 0.47
TAX
d
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.000 0.58 0.000 0.58
Shape 1.847 48.52 *** 1.849 47.55 *** 1.840 48.79 *** 1.842 48.59 *** 1.842 47.53 ***
Observations 4583 4583 4583 4583 4583
Log Likelihood 1670 1653 1671 1669 1652
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The explanatory variables are: e, natural logarithm of the peso/US dollar nominal exchange rate; spread, measurement of the risk in
the financial markets in emerging countries; vix, measurement of risk in the financial markets in industrialized countries; Dif, the
the interest differential between Colombia and abroad; TAX, the tax equivalent to the reserve requirement on capital inflows;     , the
instrument for forex intervention; pc, prices of commodities; Dq, misalignment of the real exchange rate.   is the first difference 
operator, |.| is the absolute value operator, and Shape is the estimated value of the GED distribution shape parameter. The mean 
equation only reports one lag of the dependent variable. The symbols ***, **, * indicate a statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively.





















Table 2.2 Effect of the capital control and forex intervention on the peso/US dollar 
exchange rate mean return and its volatility  
 
Definition of the tax: TAX
O-T-R     







Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig.
Equation for the mean of the return
Constant 0.000 0.01 0.000 0.03 0.000 -0.01 0.000 0.01 -0.001 -0.05
 e t-1 0.171 12.86 *** 0.171 12.88 *** 0.170 12.71 *** 0.171 12.89 *** 0.170 12.75 ***
 spread t 0.003 2.71 *** 0.004 2.79 *** 0.003 2.71 *** 0.003 2.70 *** 0.004 2.72 ***
vix t 0.001 1.24 0.001 1.26 0.001 1.26 0.001 1.25 0.001 1.34
 Dif t -0.000 -0.33 -0.000 -0.33 -0.000 -0.34 -0.000 -0.42 -0.000 -0.40
TAX
O-T-R
t 0.000 0.69 0.000 0.74 0.000 0.58 0.000 0.67 0.000 0.55
-0.000 -0.45 -0.000 -0.48 -0.000 -0.06 -0.000 -0.40 -0.000 -0.06
 pc t -0.028 -6.49 *** -0.028 -6.53 *** -0.028 -6.55 *** -0.028 -6.51 *** -0.028 -6.56 ***
Dq t- 1 -0.001 -4.09 *** -0.001 -4.21 *** -0.001 -4.11 *** -0.001 -4.10 *** -0.001 -4.27 ***
TAX
O-T-R
t* spread t --- --- -0.000 -1.37 --- --- --- --- -0.000 -1.41
TAX
O-T-R
t* --- --- --- --- -0.000 -1.17 --- --- -0.000 -0.94
TAX
O-T-R
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.000 0.23 0.000 0.29
Equation for the variance of the return
a 0.210 15.56 *** 0.210 15.56 *** 0.211 15.66 *** 0.211 15.58 *** 0.210 15.66 ***
b 0.790 58.40 *** 0.790 58.52 *** 0.789 58.56 *** 0.789 58.43 *** 0.790 58.84 ***
| spread t| 0.000 1.13 0.000 1.43 0.000 1.28 0.000 1.28 ** 0.000 1.54
vix t 0.000 2.49 ** 0.000 2.30 ** 0.000 2.28 ** 0.000 2.36 *** 0.000 2.17 **
| Dif t| 0.000 2.43 ** 0.000 2.45 ** 0.000 2.42 ** 0.000 2.41 ** 0.000 2.42 **
TAX
O-T-R
t 0.000 0.41 0.000 0.34 0.000 0.66 0.000 0.21 0.000 0.54
0.000 2.71 *** 0.000 2.64 *** 0.000 1.24 0.000 2.46 ** 0.000 1.29
| pc t| -0.001 -0.82 -0.001 -0.88 -0.001 -0.67 -0.001 -0.79 -0.001 -0.74
TAX
O-T-R
t* spread t --- --- -0.000 -0.89 --- --- --- --- -0.000 -0.85
TAX
O-T-R
t* --- --- --- --- 0.000 2.12 ** --- --- 0.000 2.13 **
TAX
O-T-R
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.000 0.66 0.000 0.22
Shape 1.839 48.46 *** 1.838 48.25 *** 1.831 47.98 *** 1.837 48.25 *** 1.828 47.98 ***
Observations 4583 4583 4583 4583 4583
Log Likelihood 1677 1676 1674 1676 1673
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The symbols ***, **, * indicate a statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The mean equation only reports one lag
of the dependent variable.










Table 2.3 Effect of the capital control and forex intervention on the peso/US dollar 
exchange rate mean return and its volatility  
 
Definition of the tax: TAX
E-R     







Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig.
Equation for the mean of the return
Constant 0.002 0.19 0.001 0.06 0.002 0.21 0.002 0.23 0.001 0.06
 e t-1 0.171 12.86 *** 0.172 12.91 *** 0.170 12.71 *** 0.171 12.88 *** 0.171 12.77 ***
 spread t 0.003 2.75 *** 0.005 3.16 *** 0.004 2.87 *** 0.003 2.77 *** 0.005 3.23 ***
vix t 0.001 1.14 0.001 1.33 0.001 1.16 0.001 1.10 0.001 1.35
 Dif t -0.000 -0.33 -0.000 -0.39 -0.000 -0.34 -0.000 -0.35 -0.000 -0.38
TAX
E-R
t -0.000 -0.02 -0.000 -0.17 -0.000 -0.30 -0.000 -0.03 -0.000 -0.46
-0.000 -0.51 -0.000 -0.35 -0.000 -0.25 -0.000 -0.48 -0.000 -0.37
 pc t -0.029 -6.66 *** -0.028 -6.59 *** -0.029 -6.74 *** -0.029 -6.64 *** -0.029 -6.61 ***
Dq t- 1 -0.002 -4.22 *** -0.002 -4.45 *** -0.002 -4.40 *** -0.002 -4.21 *** -0.002 -4.49 ***
TAX
E-R
t* spread t --- --- -0.000 -1.74 * --- --- --- --- -0.000 -2.03 **
TAX
E-R
t* --- --- --- --- -0.000 -0.46 --- --- -0.000 -0.27
TAX
E-R
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.000 0.04 0.000 0.00
Equation for the variance of the return
a 0.210 15.58 *** 0.210 15.61 *** 0.210 15.75 *** 0.210 15.56 *** 0.209 15.64 ***
b 0.790 58.60 *** 0.790 58.56 *** 0.790 59.09 *** 0.790 58.50 *** 0.791 59.15 ***
| spread t| 0.000 1.13 0.000 1.47 ** 0.000 1.52 0.000 1.20 0.001 1.71 *
vix t 0.000 2.52 ** 0.000 2.34 ** 0.000 2.14 ** 0.000 2.43 ** 0.000 2.14 **
| Dif t| 0.000 2.45 ** 0.000 2.47 ** 0.000 2.46 ** 0.000 2.45 ** 0.000 2.45 **
TAX
E-R
t 0.000 0.30 0.000 0.15 0.000 0.64 0.000 0.23 0.000 0.53
0.000 2.77 *** 0.000 2.73 *** 0.000 0.98 0.000 2.55 ** 0.000 0.95
| pc t| -0.001 -0.88 -0.001 -0.95 -0.001 -0.78 -0.001 -0.87 -0.001 -0.96
TAX
E-R
t* spread t --- --- -0.000 -0.85 --- --- --- --- -0.000 -0.83
TAX
E-R
t* --- --- --- --- 0.000 2.30 ** --- --- 0.000 2.25 **
TAX
E-R
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.000 0.30 0.000 0.03
Shape 1.839 48.36 *** 1.837 48.15 *** 1.824 47.94 *** 1.839 47.99 *** 1.830 47.90 ***
Observations 4583 4583 4583 4583 4583
Log Likelihood 1677 1675 1674 1677 1672
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The symbols ***, **, * indicate a statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The mean equation only reports one lag
of the dependent variable.










The  rest  of  control  variables  such  as  the  measure  of  risk  perception  in  EM,  the  prices  of 
commodities and the misalignment of the real exchange rate are statistically significant and with 
the expected signs in the equation for the mean of the return. These show that, together with the 
lagged self-comportment of the return, those variables are the determinants of the daily average 
behavior of the exchange rate return of the peso. As for the variance equation, the risk perception 
in  Global  Markets  and  the  volatility  of  the  interest  rate  differential  seem  to  be  the  key 
determinants of the return volatility of the peso.  
 
It is interesting to note four things: The first one is that a determining variable of the mean return 
for the exchange rate in portfolio models such as the interest differential turns out to be non-
significant in all of the regressions. That is not a surprising result given the fact that the sum of 
gross  private  portfolio  flows  and  private  debt  (which  are  mostly  dependent  on  interest  rate 
differentials) are a small portion of total capital flows of the balance of payments. For instance, 
for the period 1994-2009, these private flows amounted on average to 30% of the capital account 
balance  (gross  private  portfolio  flows  added  to  only  1%).  In  contrast,  gross  foreign  direct 
investment (FDI) and public flows were on average equivalent to 70% of the capital account 
balance. Since FDI and public flows respond to different incentives, it is easy to understand the 
reason why the interest rate differential turned out to be non-significant for explaining the mean 
return of the exchange rate.  
 
The second one, which contrasts to the above result, is that the interest rate differential happened 
to be a key determinant of the volatility of the exchange rate return. More precisely, variations of 
the interest rate differential raises without ambiguity the volatility of the exchange rate return. 
This result might be a consequence of the short term character of private capital flows, both 
portfolio and debt that instill volatility to the exchange rate.  
 
The third thing to note is the important role played by the behavior of the price of commodities 
in determining the mean of the return, where, in most of the cases an increase in those prices 
reduces the exchange rate return, that is, appreciates the peso.  
 
The  fourth  one  is  the  role  played  by  the  error  correction  mechanism  captured  by  the 
misalignment of the real exchange rate: According to the size of the coefficient, it seems to take 
a lot of time to the nominal exchange rate to adjust and come back to the level required by the 
equilibrium real exchange rate.      
 
Due to the size of the sample analyzed, an additional mandatory test is a stability or perseverance 
test of the parameters in the model.
24 If there are structural changes, biases may appear in the 
estimates and the predictions incorporate greater uncertainty. Here, we implement the Lundbergh 
and Terasvirta test (2002) in the version proposed by  Franses and van Dijk (2000, equation 
(4.105), p. 186) and the Nyblom fluctuations test (1989). The results for both tests reject the null 
                                                 
24 The coefficients can change over time because the structure of the economy or the economic policy regime 
changes, because the parameters of the regression model depend on other variables outside of the model and these 
change or because the parameters are random variables. According to the Colombian economic history and the test 
cited, the first reason seems to explain the behavior of the current data.     
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hypothesis of the perseverance of the parameters.
25 
   
In order to incorporate this result, and to evaluate the effectiveness of the capital control and 
forex intervention per periods of interest, we decided to use four sub-samples. The criteria for 
selecting the first two subsamples is based on the structural change that was detected by the end 
of the 90's as a result of the modification of the monetary and foreign exchange regimes adopted 
in 1999. The third subsample is chosen to evaluate closely the changes in the nature and size of 
the forex intervention. The last subsample is based on the important change that happened during 
2008 in the nature of the central bank intervention in the forex market.  
 
The  first  sub-sample  covers  the  period  when  the  exchange  rate  was  controlled  through  a 
crawling-peg  and  an  exchange  rate  band,  and  the  monetary  policy  was  guided  by  money 
aggregates (1993:01:04 to 1999:09:30). The second covers the period with a floating exchange 
rate and an inflation targeting monetary  regime (1999:10:01 to 2010:07:30).  We categorized 
these sub-samples by following what was suggested by Villar and Rincon (2003) in the first case 
and Gomez et al. (2002) in the second one. The third sub-sample (2004:01:01 to 2010:07:30), 
covers as mentioned, a period of a very active forex intervention policy and also coincides with 
the consolidation of the inflation targeting regime, once the economy had fully recovered from 
the  economic  crisis  of  the  end  of  the  nineties.
26  Finally,  the  fourth  sub-sample  includes 
exclusively  the  period  of  preannounced  intervention  (2008:01:01  to  2010:07:30).  It  must  be 
noticed that for this latter sub-sample it is not necessary to instrument the intervention variable 
since,  due  its  preannounced  character,  the  feedback  effects  between  intervention  and  the 
exchange rate return do not occur. Thus, for the estimations we used directly the market-size-
weighted preannounced intervention variable.      
  
6.2 Estimations for the sub-samples 
 
In  this  section,  we  will  show  and  discuss  the results  of  the simultaneous  estimations  of the 
AR(2)-IGARCH(1,1),  AR(1)-IGARCH(1,1),  AR(1)-IGARCH(1,1),  and  AR(1)-IGARCH(1,1) 
models  for  the  mean  and  variance  of  the  exchange  rate  return  for  the  four  sub-samples, 
respectively. As before, we carried out the different diagnostic and specification tests, which are 
not shown here. Just like with the total sample, we estimated a regression for each definition of 
the tax equivalent to the URR and, at the same time, five specifications of the model according to 
the  explanatory  variables  included  in  it.  In  order  to  guarantee  comparability  with  previous 
results, we kept the same assumptions with regard to the distribution of the unexpected returns, 
the other assumptions on their behavior, and the method of estimation and optimization. 
 
The estimates are summarized in Table 3 and the results of individual regressions are shown in 
Appendix A.8. To make reading easier, the table summary only shows the predominant results 
                                                 
25 In the first case, the LM (Lagrange Multiplier) static is equal to 82.47 and the critical value of χ
2 test with 3 
degrees of freedom and a significance level of 1% is 11.34. In the second, the statistic for the joint test of the 
coefficients is equal to 12.84 with a p-value of 0.00. 
 
26 Strictly speaking, Gomez (2006) argues that the Colombian inflation targeting regime started in January 2001. In 




even if they do not necessarily coincide with those of any regression in particular.  
 
First of all, the capital control turned out to be non-significant in all the sub-samples and when it 
is significant, the return falls and the volatility of the return increases.
27 Thus, we find that the 
foreign exchange policy does not seem to benefit from the capital control. On the contrary, it 
might bring about costs, something that differs from former findings. 
 
Secondly, like for the total sample and without ambiguity, forex intervention does not have any 
effect on the mean of the return in any of the sub-samples but it did raised volatility, at least in 
the first sub-sample. This result match the hypothesis put forward by Dominguez (1998), who 
argues  that  when  the  signal  of  a  FX  intervention  lack  credibility,  its  only  effect  would  be 
increasing the volatility of the exchange rate, without affecting its level.    
 
The interaction variables delivered interesting results as explain below. A general result is that 
none of them in any sub-sample affect the volatility of the return, and for the first sub-sample 
none affect the mean. This indicates that during the first sub-sample the combined policies were 
ineffective either to reduce the short-run pressures on the forex market when facing external 
shocks, to modify the daily average return, or to make monetary policy more autonomous. 
 
During the second and third sub-samples the interaction between the capital control and the 
spread -as a measure of risk in EM-, unambiguously increased the return. This result suggests 
that the capital control was unable to isolate the exchange rate return from external shocks. In 
contrast, during the fourth sub-sample, it seems that capital controls did play such a role. Now, 
when  the  capital  control  and  the  forex  intervention  were  used  simultaneously  a  statistically 
significant positive effect was obtained for the last sub-sample, thus making the return higher as 
expected.      
 
This latter finding is of particular interest for discussing policy decisions, its momentum and its 
effectiveness. As shown in tables A.8.10-A.8.12, the interaction between the capital control and 
the forex intervention variable (TAX
j*I) turned out to be positive and significant for the most 
recent sub-sample. The capital control by imposing a URR had been established since May 6 
2007, and then in June 24 of 2008, the central bank initiated a preannounced intervention while 
maintaining the URR. The interaction of these two policies lasted 75 working days until October 
6 2008. Several weeks before the beginning of this policy overlapping period, important events 
were  happening  in  the  world  financial  markets  that  started  to  put  upward  pressure  on  risk 
perception. In particular, risk measures like the EMBI
+, our measure of risk in EM, the Credit 
Default Swaps (CDS) on 5yr corporate Colombian debt; and the High Yield Spread were all 
increasing.
28 As a result, days before the outset of the preannounced intervention, the Colombian 
exchange rate had ceased to appreciate, and was starting to show an incipient depreciation trend 
(Figure 2). 
                                                 
27 On this regard, Cordella (1998) argues that capital controls could induce instead of restrain capital inflows if they 
are effective in reducing a country’s vulnerability to external shocks. In such a case, capital control would reduce 
instead of increase a country’s currency return. 
          
28 Unfortunately, we could not use the latest two measurements as alternative measures of risk in our estimations 
because they were not available for the total sample. However, when we used the CDS as the measurement of risk in 
EM instead of the EMBI
+ the results did not change much. 24 
 
Table 3 Effect of the capital control and forex intervention on the peso/US dollar exchange 
rate mean return and its volatility: summary for the sub-samples 
 
 
Variable Equation for the mean of the return Equation for the variance of the return
Controlled exchange rate and monetary policy guided by money aggregates (1993:01:04 - 1999:09:30)
   TAX
j
i S but not robust NS/S and volatlity increases
NS S and volatility increases
    TAX
j
t* spread t NS NS
    TAX
j
t* NS NS
    TAX
d
t* Dif t NS NS
Floating exchange rate and inflation targeting monetary regime (1999:10:01 - 2010:07:30)
   TAX
j
i NS/S and returns falls S and volatility increases
NS NS
    TAX
j
t* spread t S and return increases NS
    TAX
j
t* NS NS
    TAX
d
t* Dif t S and return increases NS
Secret and preannounced forex intervention (2004:01:01 - 2010:07:30)
   TAX
j
i NS NS/S and volatlity increases
NS NS
    TAX
j
t* spread t S and return increases NS
    TAX
j
t* NS NS
    TAX
d
t* Dif t S and return increases NS
Preannounced forex intervention (2008:01:01 - 2010:07:30)




    TAX
j
t* spread t S and return decreases NS
    TAX
j
t* S and return increases NS
    TAX
d
t* Dif t NS NS
Source: Tables A.7-1 - A.7-9.
NS: No significance at 1%, 5% or 10% level.



































As can be seen, the interaction of control and intervention since June 24 gave a boost to the 
ongoing  depreciation  trend. The  exchange  rate  even overshoots  during  the  first  few days  of 
intervention, and then maintained a depreciation trend all along the interaction period. So it is not 
a surprise that the interaction of control-intervention turned out to be significant for increasing 
the exchange rate return in this sub-sample. Another fact that may have contributed to this result 
is that before the interaction period the URR had been progressively reinforced, by extending it 
to a larger number of operations (imports financing; several modalities of foreign credit) while at 
the  same  time  the  regulation  regarding  the  minimum  permanence  period  of  foreign  direct 
investment  in  Colombia  was  extended  from  one  to  two  years.
29  This  upgrading  of  capital 
controls together with the preannounced intervention at the right moment were key factors that 
helped  to  achieve  the  desired  effect  of  depreciating  the  exchange  rate,  without  increasing 
volatility. 
 
Figure 2 Peso/US dollar exchange rate and international risk indicators in the prelude of 






                                                 
29 Moreover, as we said above, a ceiling on derivative positions, not captured by our capital control measurements, 
had been imposed in 2007, and then tightened in 2008. In addition, in May 2007 the URR was extended to portfolio 
inflows by foreign residents.   
Source: Banco de la República and Bloomberg.   
(Shadowed area: Interaction TAX*I)






























































































Lastly, in two out of the four sub-samples, the interaction variable between the capital control 
and the interest differential was statistically significant. This means that for particular periods of 
time the capital control allowed monetary authorities to gain some autonomy since they could 
increase  interest  rate  without  putting  additional  appreciation  pressure  on  the  exchange  rate. 
Notice that this result is at odds with the finding that neither the capital control nor the interest 
differential was statistically significant. 
 
The rest of the explanatory variables change their sign and statistical significance depending on 
the sample that was analyzed (Appendix A.8). The variable spread resulted significant but with 
an opposite sign to what was expected in the equation for the mean of the return in the first sub-
sample. This indicates that an increase in the risk in emerging countries reduced the exchange 
rate return for the peso during the period of managed exchange rate and monetary aggregates as 
policy instruments. This result can be explained by the reaction function of monetary authorities 
during that policy regime, which led them to tighten monetary policy to defend the exchange rate 
during periods of negative external shocks, thus inducing a peso appreciation. On the other hand, 
the variable vix resulted significant and with the expected positive sign in the equation for the 
mean of the return in this subsample. In contrast, since 1999 up to now, that is, during the 
floating  exchange  rate  and  inflation  targeting  period,  both  the  spread  and  vix  variables 
unambiguously turned out to be statistically significant and had the expected sign. Accordingly, 
a positive variation of the risk in Emerging and Global Markets increases the foreign exchange 
rate  return,  making the  exchange  rate  recovering  its  stabilization  role. Notice,  however,  that 
when the last two sub-samples are considered, the variable vix lose its importance as determinant 
of the peso return. In the case of the spread, its volatility unambiguously increases the foreign 
exchange rate volatility during the second sub-sample. This does not happen when the last two 
sub-samples are considered and it loses its importance as determinant of the return volatility. 
 
Contrary  to  what  was  expected,  the  variations  in  the  interest  differential  did  not  have  any 
statistically significant effect on the mean of the return except in the last sub-sample when it 
reduced the  return,  as  expected,  while  –in  the  first  sub-sample-  its  volatility  unambiguously 
induced a greater volatility of the return. This result might have to do with the fact that during 
the first sub-sample, especially during the second part of the sub-sample, the risk perception 
abroad on the Colombian economy was relatively high, due to an unsolved fiscal situation and a 
high public debt, which discouraged foreign capitals different from direct investment to come in 
despite positive interest rate differentials.    
 
The  price  of  commodities  and  the  misalignment  of  the  real  exchange  rate  play  also  a 
fundamental role in determining the exchange rate return of the peso as shown by the size, sign 
and statistical significance of their coefficients. As before, their importance and robustness is 
missed  during  the  first  sub-sample,  which  corroborates  the  miss-functioning  of  the  different 
monetary and exchange rate channels during that period. During the last sub-sample, the role of 
the misalignment of the real exchange rate as an error correction is missed again. As for the 
volatility of the return, the volatility of the price of commodities plays no role.      
 
Finally, it is important to observe two things: the high persistence of the exchange rate return, 
independently  of  the  subsample  analyzed,  which  coincides  with  the  findings  for  the  entire 
sample, and that volatility of the return is mostly determined sub-sample by sub-sample by its 27 
 
own volatility and by the term capturing the clustering property of the return.  
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
The  policy  debate  on  how  to  manage  the  renewal  of  international  capital  inflows  and  the 
resulting appreciation trend is currently a crucial issue in many emerging economies. In an effort 
to prevent the possible damage that an excessive currency appreciation could cause on their 
economies, an increasing number of countries have decided to intervene in the foreign exchange 
market,  and  some  of  them  have  also  imposed  capital  controls.  Intervening  in  the  foreign 
exchange market and/or imposing restrictions on capital mobility are costly policies, in terms of 
market efficiency. Hence these decisions should be based on a cost-benefit analysis. On this 
regard, the key question is whether these policies are effective. 
 
In this paper we evaluated the effectiveness of capital controls and central bank intervention in 
the  foreign  exchange  market  for  depreciating  the  exchange  rate,  reducing  its  volatility,  and 
diminishing the exchange rate vulnerability to external shocks. For this purpose, the paper used 
high frequency data for Colombia for the 1993 to 2010 period and a GARCH model of the 
peso/US dollar exchange rate return. 
  
The key general finding indicates that neither capital control nor central bank interventions were 
successful  for  inducing  a  currency  depreciation.  In  addition,  as  a  side  effect,  these  policies 
increased the exchange rate volatility. Nonetheless, and exclusively during the period 2008 -
2010,  when  the  capital  control  and  intervention  in  the  foreign  exchange  market  were  used 
simultaneously,  the  interaction  of  both  policies  turned  out  to  be  statistically  significant  for 
increasing the exchange rate return (depreciate the peso), with no statistical significant effect on 
the exchange rate volatility. 
 
Finally,  we  found  that  the  fundamental  determinants  of  the  daily  average  behavior  of  the 
exchange rate return are its own past behavior, the risk in Emerging and Global Markets, the 
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Appendix A.2 Literature review on the effectiveness of the capital control (the compulsory 
non-remunerated reserve requirement on capital inflows) in Colombia 
 
Authors Type of
Period of analysis Average  Average intervention Data Procedure Asummed  Intervention
(mm/yy) daily return daily volatility being evaluated Mean Variance frequency distribution indicator
(%) (%)
Toro and Julio (2005)
  Sep/04 - Apr/05 -0.12 0.39 Discretionary  Increase (devaluation) Increase Intra-day GARCH(1,1) GED Non weighted
intervention   Length: Non estimated
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kamil (2008)
  Sep/04 - Mar/06 -0.02 0.28 Buy (options and Increase (devaluation) Fall Daily 2S-IV,* TOBIT, Normal Non weighted
discretionary)   Length: "short-lived" GARCH




  Apr/99 - Aug/08 0.02 0.43 Buy (options and Increase (devaluation) Fall Daily 2S-IV,* TOBIT, t-student Non weighted




  Jan/00  - Aug/08  0.04 0.39 Net buy (options,  Increase (devaluation) --- Monthly SVAR, Variance White noise Non weighted
volatility and    Length: 1 month decomposition
discretionary)
Source: Authors' compilation.
* There is not correction of the estandard errors when using an Instrumental Varaibles procedure.
Return
Observed exchange rate Economtric results Data and econometrics
Authors Type of capital inflows Efectiveness of 
Period of analysis being studied the control Data Procedure
(mm/yy) (Yes: It reduced influjos) frequency
Cárdenas and Barrera (1997)
  Feb/85 - Jun/95 Total private No, but it changed Monthly OLS
the term structure
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ocampo and Tovar (1997)
  Jan/90 - Jun/96 Cash Yes, and it changed Monthly OLS
Commerce the term structure
Nonfinancial services
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rocha and Mesa (1998)




   Oct/93 - Aug/98 Short term Yes Monthly Cointegration
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Villar and Rincon (2003)*
  Sep/93 - Sept/99 --- It helped autorities to Monthly 2S-IV** and 




   Jan/00 - Sep/07 Long term No Monthly OLS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Concha, Galindo and
Quevedo (2007) Short term Yes Monthly Cointegration
  Jan/98 - Aug/07 Long term No and GARCH
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clements and Kamil (2009)
   Jul/06 - Jul/08 Credit Yes Weekly OLS
Portfolio No
Foreing check accounts No
Total inflows, except
foreing direct investment No
Source: Authors' compilation.
* They do not ustudy the direct effect of capital controls on capital inflows. Instead, they build up a model of the real exchange  
and interest rates to test whether or not contols helped autorities to increase autonomy by relaxing the dilemmas inherent
to the impossible trinity.
** Instrumental Variables procedure.
Data and econometrics32 
 
Appendix A.3 Summary of legislation regarding the compulsory non-remunerated reserve 
requirement on capital inflows  
 
 
Maximun term for the loan subjet to deposit (months) Porcentage of the loan Currency
Number/Year Date (mm/dd) (tc) (ε) (Days) (Months)
21/93 Sep/2 18 47.0% 12 US dollars
7/94 Mar/15 36 93.0% 12 US dollars
64.0% 18 "
50.0% 24 "
22/94 Aug/12 60 140.0% 1-30 1 US dollars
137.2% 31-60 2 "
134.5% 61-90 3 "
131.8% 91-120 4 "
129.2% 121-150 5 "
126.6% 151-180 6 "
124.1% 181-210 7 "
121.6% 211-240 8 "
119.2% 241-270 9 "
116.8% 271-300 10 "
114.5% 301-330 11 "
112.2% 331-360 12 "
110.0% 361-390 13 "
107.8% 391-420 14 "
105.7% 421-450 15 "
103.6% 451-480 16 "
101.5% 481-510 17 "
99.5% 511-540 18 "
97.5% 541-570 19 "
95.6% 571-600 20 "
93.7% 601-630 21 "
91.8% 631-660 22 "
90.0% 661-690 23 "
88.2% 691-720 24 "
86.4% 721-750 25 "
84.7% 751-780 26 "
83.0% 781-810 27 "
81.4% 811-840 28 "
79.7% 841-870 29 "
78.2% 871-900 30 "
76.6% 901-930 31 "
75.1% 931-960 32 "
73.6% 961-990 33 "
72.1% 991-1020 34 "
70.7% 1021-1050 35 "
69.3% 1051-1080 36 "
67.9% 1081-1110 37 "
66.5% 1111-1140 38 "
65.2% 1141-1170 39 "
63.9% 1171-1200 40 "
62.7% 1201-1230 41 "
61.4% 1231-1260 42 "
60.2% 1261-1290 43 "
59.0% 1291-1320 44 "
57.8% 1321-1350 45 "
56.7% 1351-1380 46 "
55.5% 1381-1410 47 "
54.4% 1411-1440 48 "
53.3% 1441-1470 49 "
52.3% 1471-1500 50 "
51.2% 1501-1530 51 "
50.2% 1531-1560 52 "
49.2% 1561-1590 53 "
48.2% 1591-1620 54 "
47.3% 1621-1650 55 "
46.3% 1651-1680 56 "
45.4% 1681-1710 57 "
44.5% 1711-1740 58 "
43.6% 1741-1770 59 "
42.8% 1771-1800 60 "
3/96 Feb/15 48 85.0% 1-180 6 US dollars
83.0% 181-270 9 "
79.0% 271-360 12 "
75.0% 361-450 15 "
70.0% 451-540 18 "
65.0% 541-630 21 "
60.0% 631-720 24 "
54.0% 721-810 27 "
48.0% 811-900 30 "
42.0% 901-990 33 "
36.0% 991-1080 36 "
29.0% 1081-1170 39 "
23.0% 1171-1260 42 "
17.0% 1261-1350 45 "
10.0% 1351-1440 48 "
5/96 Mar/15 36 50.0% 18 US dollars
4/97 Mar/12 60 50.0% 18 US dollars
5/97 Mar/20 All 30.0% 18 US dollars&Pesos
1/98 Jan/30 All 25.0% 12 Pesos
10/98 Sep/18 All 10.0% 6 Pesos
6/00 Apr/28 All 0.0% 0 ---
2/07 May/6 All 40.0% 6 Pesos
10/08 Oct/8 All 0% 0 ---
Source: Authors' compilation.
Time of the deposit (tm ) Resolutions of the Banco de la Republica33 
 
Appendix A.4 Series and sources 
•  90-day  CDs:  It  is  the  weighted  average  of  90-day  CD  rates  of  banks  and  financial 
corporations. The holidays and other days that were missing from the series were assigned the 
data from the immediately preceding day. Therefore, the series was available for the same dates 
as those used for the representative market rate (TRM in Spanish). Source: Statistics Section, 
Division of Economic Studies, Banco de la República. 
•  EMBI+: It is the difference in interest rate paid by the bonds denominated in dollars and 
the US Treasury Bonds (the holidays and other days missing from the series had the data from 
the immediately preceding day.  Therefore, the series was available for the same dates as those 
used for the TRM. Source: Foreign Sector Section, Department of Planning and Inflation, Banco 
de la República. 
•  VIX:  It  is  the  Chicago  Board  Options  Exchange  Volatility  Index,  which  “reflects  a 
market  estimate  of  future  volatility  (30  day  usually),  based  on  the  weighted  average  of  the 
implied volatilities for a wide range of strikes. 1st & 2nd month expirations are used until 8 days 
from expiration, then the 2nd and 3rd are used”. Source: Bloomberg (Ticker: VIX+Index). 
•  Net foreign exchange intervention (millions of dollars): The intervention of Banco de la 
Republica in the interbanking foreign currency market. If the number is positive, it means the 
purchases were larger than the sales. The holidays and other days missing from the series had the 
data from the immediately preceding day. Therefore, the series was available for the same dates 
as those used for the TRM. Source: Monetary and Reserves Division, Banco de la República.   
•  Weighted intervention: It is the “net foreign exchange intervention” series weighted by a 
moving average of 20 observations of the “size of the foreign exchange market.” 
•  90-day LIBOR (London-Interbank Offered Rate): It is the London interbanking rate for 
90-day  loans.  The  holidays  and  other  days  missing  from  the  series  had  the  data  from  the 
immediately preceding day.  Therefore, the series was available for the same dates as those used 
for the TRM. Source: Monetary and Reserves Division, Banco de la República. 
•  Overnight LIBOR: It is the London interbanking rate for one-day loans. The holidays and 
other days missing from the series had the data from the immediately preceding day.  Therefore, 
the series was available for the same dates as those used for the TRM. Source: Monetary and 
Reserves Division, Banco de la República. 
•  Size of the foreign currency market (millions of dollars): The total amount transacted in 
the foreign currency interbanking market through operations registered in the DATATEC system 
(previously known as CITIINFO). The holidays and other days missing from the series had the 
data from the immediately preceding day.  Therefore, the series was available for the same dates 
as those used for the TRM. Source: Monetary and Reserves Division, Banco de la República. 
•  TRM: It is the nominal daily exchange rate reported by the Banking Superintendency 
(now Financial Superintendency). Source: Statistics Section, Division of Economic Studies and 
Monetary and Reserves Division, Banco de la República. 
•  Interbanking rate (TIB in Spanish) or the Banking Superintendency basic rate. The series 
has existed since 1995:01:03 and which is why the data between 1993:01:04 and 1995:02:28 are 
taken  from  the  survey  done  by  Banco  de  la  Republica  (the  series  between  1993:01:04  and 
1995:02:28 is known as “TIB modal”). The holidays and other days missing from the series had 
the data from the immediately preceding day. Therefore, the series was available for the same 
dates as those used for the TRM. Source: Statistics Section, Division of Economic Studies, and 
Monetary and Reserves Division, Banco de la República. 
•  TAX
i (i = d, O-T-R, E-R): It is the tax equivalent to the reserve requirements on foreign 34 
 
debt. It is calculated as explained above. Source: Authors’ calculations.  
•  Commodity price index: It is the  arithmetic mean of commodity prices with monthly 
readjustment. Source: Bloomberg (ticker: CRY). 
•  CDS: It is a Credit Default Swaps  “designed to transfer the credit exposure of fixed 
income products between parties. The buyer of a credit swap receives credit protection, whereas 
the  seller  of  the  swap  guarantees  the  credit  worthiness  of  the  product”.  Source:  Bloomberg 
(Ticker: CCOL1U5+Index, which is based on 5yr corporate Colombian debt.  
•  HYS: It is the BofA Merrill Lynch US High Yield Index, which “tracks the performance 
of U.S. dollar denominated below investment grade corporate debt publicly issued in the U.S. 
domestic market. Qualifying securities must have a below investment grade rating (based on an 
average of Moody’s, S&P and Fitch) and an investment grade rated country of risk (based on an 
average of Moody’s, S&P and Fitch foreign currency long term sovereign debt ratings)”. Source: 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix A.8 Effect of the capital control and forex intervention on the peso/US dollar 
exchange rate mean return and its volatility     
 
A.8-1 
Definition of the tax: TAX
d  




Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig.
Equation for the mean of the return
Constant 0.004 0.31 -0.000 -6.13 *** -0.005 -0.26 0.005 0.46 0.001 0.03
 e t-1 0.202 9.15 *** -0.000 -7.46 *** 0.204 9.18 *** 0.202 9.09 *** 0.201 9.02 ***
 spread t -0.003 -2.10 ** -0.000 -10.01 *** -0.003 -2.02 ** -0.002 -1.85 * 0.002 0.50
vix t 0.002 2.61 *** 0.000 0.47 0.002 2.65 *** 0.002 2.67 *** 0.002 2.73 ***
 Dif t 0.000 0.08 -0.000 -5.20 *** 0.000 0.06 -0.007 -1.79 * -0.006 -1.39
TAX
d
t -0.019 -2.08 ** -0.000 -7.77 *** -0.012 -0.83 -0.021 -2.37 ** -0.019 -1.36
-0.000 -0.21 -0.000 -4.49 *** -0.004 -0.67 -0.000 -0.15 -0.004 -0.65
 pc t -0.006 -0.98 -0.000 -10.07 *** -0.007 -1.13 -0.008 -1.33 -0.007 -1.11
Dq t- 1 0.000 0.04 -0.000 -6.02 *** 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.21 0.000 0.08
TAX
d
t* spread t --- --- -0.000 -9.35 *** --- --- --- --- -0.005 -1.06
TAX
d
t* --- --- --- --- 0.004 0.65 --- --- 0.004 0.63
TAX
d
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.008 1.89 * 0.006 1.51
Equation for the variance of the return
a 0.263 11.12 *** 0.299 10.27 *** 0.271 11.05 *** 0.269 11.36 *** 0.277 11.02 ***
b 0.737 31.20 *** 0.701 24.06 *** 0.729 29.71 *** 0.731 30.87 *** 0.723 28.72 ***
| spread t| 0.000 0.23 0.000 2.15 ** 0.000 0.66 0.000 0.24 0.000 1.21
vix t 0.000 0.21 0.000 2.89 *** 0.000 1.06 -0.000 -0.06 0.000 0.99
| Dif t| 0.001 2.39 ** 0.002 4.02 *** 0.001 2.32 ** 0.001 2.53 ** 0.001 2.37 **
TAX
d
t 0.001 1.41 0.001 3.31 *** -0.001 -0.75 0.001 1.61 -0.001 -0.90
0.000 3.30 *** 0.000 4.07 *** 0.001 2.25 ** 0.000 3.65 *** 0.001 2.50 **
| pc t| -0.000 -0.13 -0.001 -1.13 0.001 0.60 0.000 0.06 0.002 0.75
TAX
d
t* spread t --- --- -0.001 -2.60 *** --- --- --- --- -0.001 -1.86 *
TAX
d
t* --- --- --- --- -0.001 -1.92 * --- --- -0.001 -2.12 **
TAX
d
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.001 -1.14 -0.001 -1.01
Shape 1.959 31.80 *** 2.107 24.43 *** 1.958 31.31 *** 1.950 31.70 *** 1.967 31.09 ***
Observations 1754 1754 1754 1754 1754
Log Likelihood 49 117 47 47 43
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The explanatory variables are: e, natural logarithm of the peso/US dollar nominal exchange rate; spread, measurement of the risk in
the financial markets in emerging countries; vix, measurement of risk in the financial markets in industrialized countries; Dif, the
the interest differential between Colombia and abroad; TAX, the tax equivalent to the reserve requirement on capital inflows;     , the
instrument for forex intervention; pc, prices of commodities; Dq, misalignment of the real exchange rate.   is the first difference 
operator, |.| is the absolute value operator, and Shape is the estimated value of the GED distribution shape parameter. The mean 
equation only reports one lag of the dependent variable. The symbols ***, **, * indicate a statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively.























Definition of the tax: TAX
O-T-R 








Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig.
Equation for the mean of the return
Constant -0.001 -0.06 0.001 0.09 -0.001 -0.06 0.000 0.04 0.001 0.05
 e t-1 0.199 9.04 *** 0.202 9.17 *** 0.198 8.88 *** 0.199 9.05 *** 0.200 8.94 ***
 spread t -0.002 -1.87 * -0.003 -1.81 * -0.002 -1.97 ** -0.002 -1.85 * -0.003 -1.90 *
vix t 0.002 2.46 ** 0.002 2.35 ** 0.002 2.41 ** 0.002 2.42 ** 0.002 2.39 **
 Dif t 0.001 0.35 0.001 0.44 0.000 0.27 0.001 0.53 0.001 0.55
TAX
O-T-R
t 0.000 1.83 * 0.000 1.78 * 0.000 1.75 * 0.000 1.78 * 0.000 1.56
0.000 0.12 0.000 0.11 0.000 0.11 0.000 0.10 0.000 0.10
 pc t -0.007 -1.18 -0.008 -1.24 -0.007 -1.18 -0.007 -1.10 -0.007 -1.14
Dq t- 1 0.002 2.26 ** 0.002 2.29 ** 0.002 2.18 ** 0.002 2.35 ** 0.002 2.28 **
TAX
O-T-R
t* spread t --- --- 0.000 0.89 --- --- --- --- 0.000 0.77
TAX
O-T-R
t* --- --- --- --- -0.000 -0.18 --- --- -0.000 -0.09
TAX
O-T-R
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.000 -0.25 -0.000 -0.31
Equation for the variance of the return
a 0.268 11.61 *** 0.266 11.42 *** 0.266 11.65 *** 0.267 11.53 *** 0.264 11.48 ***
b 0.732 31.73 *** 0.734 31.55 *** 0.734 32.21 *** 0.733 31.64 *** 0.736 31.96 ***
| spread t| 0.000 0.28 ** 0.000 0.45 0.000 0.24 0.000 0.36 0.000 0.28
vix t 0.000 0.80 0.000 0.74 0.000 0.87 0.000 0.76 0.000 0.91
| Dif t| 0.001 2.52 ** 0.001 2.46 ** 0.001 2.32 ** 0.001 2.49 ** 0.001 2.22 **
TAX
O-T-R
t 0.000 0.12 0.000 0.14 0.000 0.79 0.000 0.02 0.000 0.81
0.000 3.34 *** 0.000 3.22 *** 0.000 1.87 * 0.000 3.04 *** 0.000 1.82 *
| pc t| -0.001 -0.25 -0.001 -0.26 -0.001 -0.27 -0.001 -0.24 -0.001 -0.32
TAX
O-T-R
t* spread t --- --- -0.000 -0.48 --- --- --- --- -0.000 -0.25
TAX
O-T-R
t* --- --- --- --- 0.000 1.69 * --- --- 0.000 1.61
TAX
O-T-R
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.000 0.26 0.000 -0.04
Shape 1.954 32.01 *** 1.954 31.61 *** 1.945 31.50 *** 1.957 31.49 *** 1.942 31.18 ***
Observations 1754 1754 1754 1754 1754
Log Likelihood 51 50 49 50 49
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The symbols ***, **, * indicate a statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The mean equation only reports one lag
of the dependent variable.












Definition of the tax: TAX
E-R     
Sample 1:  1993:01:04 - 1999:09:30  
 





Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig.
Equation for the mean of the return
Constant -0.001 -0.05 0.000 -0.01 0.001 0.05 -0.001 -0.07 0.001 0.07
 e t-1 0.200 9.13 *** 0.201 9.15 *** 0.200 8.97 *** 0.198 9.06 *** 0.201 8.99 ***
 spread t -0.003 -2.35 ** -0.003 -2.08 ** -0.003 -2.25 ** -0.003 -2.35 ** -0.003 -2.02 **
vix t 0.002 2.41 ** 0.002 2.33 ** 0.002 2.29 *** 0.002 2.44 ** 0.002 2.23 **
 Dif t 0.001 0.52 0.001 0.44 0.001 0.51 0.001 0.44 0.000 0.15
TAX
E-R
t 0.000 1.48 0.000 1.51 0.000 1.20 0.000 1.47 0.000 1.07
0.000 0.11 0.000 0.15 -0.000 -0.02 0.000 0.11 0.000 0.03
 pc t -0.004 -0.68 -0.006 -0.95 -0.005 -0.76 -0.004 -0.66 *** -0.006 -1.05
Dq t- 1 0.002 2.26 ** 0.002 2.22 ** 0.002 2.14 ** 0.002 2.27 ** 0.002 2.02 **
TAX
E-R
t* spread t --- --- 0.000 0.73 --- --- --- --- 0.000 0.648
TAX
E-R
t* --- --- --- --- 0.000 0.13 --- --- 0.000 0.121
TAX
E-R
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.000 -0.06 0.000 0.221
Equation for the variance of the return
a 0.265 11.53 *** 0.265 11.44 *** 0.264 11.65 *** 0.265 11.51 *** 0.263 11.43 ***
b 0.735 31.96 *** 0.735 31.73 *** 0.736 32.45 *** 0.735 31.95 *** 0.737 32.00 ***
| spread t| 0.000 0.36 0.000 0.54 0.000 0.62 0.000 0.43 0.000 0.65
vix t 0.000 0.74 0.000 0.65 0.000 0.70 0.000 0.70 0.000 0.76
| Dif t| 0.001 2.55 ** 0.001 2.54 ** 0.001 2.39 ** 0.001 2.53 ** 0.001 2.29 **
TAX
E-R
t -0.000 -0.04 0.000 0.01 0.000 0.42 * -0.000 -0.10 0.000 0.68
0.000 3.31 *** 0.000 3.27 ** 0.000 1.79 * 0.000 3.14 ** 0.000 1.75 *
| pc t| -0.001 -0.23 -0.000 -0.21 -0.001 -0.27 -0.000 -0.22 -0.001 -0.35
TAX
E-R
t* spread t --- --- 0.000 -0.60 --- --- --- --- -0.000 -0.59
TAX
E-R
t* --- --- --- --- 0.000 1.40 --- --- 0.000 1.49
TAX
E-R
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.000 0.24 0.000 0.07
Shape 1.967 31.50 *** 1.958 31.03 *** 1.951 31.34 *** 1.968 31.06 *** 1.944 30.76 ***
Observations 1754 1754 1754 1754 1754
Log Likelihood 51 51 50 51 50
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The symbols ***, **, * indicate a statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The mean equation only reports one lag
of the dependent variable.












Definition of the tax: TAX
d     







Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig.
Equation for the mean of the return
Constant -0.005 -0.27 -0.002 -0.09 -0.005 -0.26 -0.004 -0.21 -0.004 -0.20
 e t-1 0.147 8.60 *** 0.143 8.37 *** 0.148 8.62 *** 0.147 8.62 *** 0.145 8.50 ***
 spread t 0.023 8.61 *** 0.021 7.43 *** 0.024 8.65 *** 0.024 8.74 *** 0.021 7.47 ***
vix t 0.002 2.41 ** 0.002 2.31 ** 0.002 2.41 ** 0.002 2.45 ** 0.002 2.45 ***
 Dif t -0.000 -0.20 -0.000 -0.05 -0.000 -0.24 -0.000 -0.84 -0.000 -0.95
TAX
d
t -0.035 -1.72 * -0.033 -1.56 -0.034 -1.31 -0.043 -2.09 ** -0.027 -0.97
0.001 0.24 -0.000 -0.04 0.001 0.18 0.000 0.10 0.001 0.12
 pc t -0.040 -6.77 *** -0.039 -6.67 *** -0.040 -6.79 *** -0.040 -6.85 *** -0.039 -6.69 ***
Dq t- 1 -0.003 -3.25 *** -0.003 -3.30 *** -0.003 -3.24 *** -0.003 -3.32 *** -0.003 -3.37 ***
TAX
d
t* spread t --- --- 0.031 3.51 *** --- --- --- --- 0.034 3.82 ***
TAX
d
t* --- --- --- --- -0.000 -0.01 --- --- -0.002 -0.24
TAX
d
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.003 1.75 * 0.003 2.03 **
Equation for the variance of the return
a 0.187 10.79 *** 0.185 10.60 *** 0.188 10.80 *** 0.187 10.80 *** 0.187 10.59 ***
b 0.813 46.83 *** 0.815 46.66 *** 0.812 46.52 *** 0.813 47.05 *** 0.813 46.07 ***
| spread t| 0.004 3.30 *** 0.003 3.19 *** 0.004 3.30 *** 0.004 3.29 *** 0.003 3.19 ***
vix t 0.000 -0.24 -0.000 -0.22 -0.000 -0.23 -0.000 -0.24 -0.000 -0.20
| Dif t| 0.000 1.01 0.000 0.97 0.000 0.97 0.000 0.93 0.000 0.89
TAX
d
t 0.007 1.68 * 0.009 1.94 * 0.013 1.64 0.006 1.51 0.020 2.33 **
-0.000 -1.08 -0.001 -1.17 -0.000 -0.94 -0.000 -0.94 -0.000 -0.93
| pc t| -0.001 -1.18 -0.001 -1.02 -0.001 -1.18 -0.001 -1.22 -0.001 -1.15
TAX
d
t* spread t --- --- 0.005 0.88 --- --- --- --- 0.007 1.11
TAX
d
t* --- --- --- --- -0.003 -1.07 --- --- -0.006 -2.20 **
TAX
d
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.001 0.45 0.000 0.09
Shape 1.756 29.73 *** 1.758 29.62 *** 1.758 29.69 *** 1.756 29.72 *** 1.765 29.60 ***
Observations 2825 2825 2825 2825 2825
Log Likelihood 1552 1547 1552 1550 1544
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The symbols ***, **, * indicate a statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The mean equation only reports one lag
of the dependent variable.





















Definition of the tax: TAX
O-T-R 








Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig.
Equation for the mean of the return
Constant -0.005 -0.30 -0.001 -0.04 -0.005 -0.29 -0.005 -0.27 -0.004 -0.23
 e t-1 0.146 8.52 *** 0.143 8.38 *** 0.147 8.52 *** 0.149 8.67 *** 0.144 8.45 ***
 spread t 0.023 8.53 *** 0.020 7.01 *** 0.023 8.56 *** 0.024 8.68 *** 0.020 7.09 ***
vix t 0.002 2.22 ** 0.002 2.16 ** 0.002 2.26 ** 0.002 2.33 *** 0.002 2.39 ***
 Dif t -0.000 -0.24 0.000 0.03 -0.000 -0.22 -0.000 -0.91 -0.000 -0.98
TAX
O-T-R
t -0.003 -1.61 -0.003 -1.63 -0.003 -0.67 -0.004 -2.02 ** -0.003 -0.71
0.001 0.22 -0.001 -0.18 0.001 0.15 0.001 0.21 0.000 0.12
 pc t -0.040 -6.74 *** -0.039 -6.63 *** -0.039 -6.72 *** -0.040 -6.78 *** -0.038 -6.46 ***
Dq t- 1 -0.003 -3.00 *** -0.003 -3.19 *** -0.003 -3.05 *** -0.003 -3.17 ** -0.003 -3.24 ***
TAX
O-T-R
t* spread t --- --- 0.005 6.21 *** --- --- --- --- 0.005 6.30 ***
TAX
O-T-R
t* --- --- --- --- -0.001 -0.22 --- --- -0.001 -0.20
TAX
O-T-R
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.000 2.03 ** 0.000 2.08 **
Equation for the variance of the return
a 0.190 10.72 *** 0.190 10.49 *** 0.190 10.76 *** 0.190 10.72 *** 0.189 10.53 ***
b 0.810 45.60 *** 0.810 44.84 *** 0.810 45.89 *** 0.810 45.83 *** 0.811 45.13 ***
| spread t| 0.003 3.11 *** 0.003 2.87 ** 0.003 3.16 *** 0.003 3.10 *** 0.003 2.92 ***
vix t -0.000 -0.08 -0.000 -0.03 * -0.000 -0.09 -0.000 -0.10 0.000 0.01
| Dif t| 0.000 0.95 0.000 0.90 *** 0.000 0.96 0.000 0.90 0.000 0.91
TAX
O-T-R
t 0.001 2.14 ** 0.001 2.30 ** 0.001 1.24 0.001 1.76 * 0.002 1.40
-0.000 -0.88 -0.000 -0.88 -0.000 -0.76 -0.000 -0.80 -0.000 -0.82
| pc t| -0.001 -1.26 -0.001 -0.96 -0.002 -1.47 -0.001 -1.29 -0.001 -1.23
TAX
O-T-R
t* spread t --- --- 0.000 0.44 * --- --- --- --- 0.000 0.29
TAX
O-T-R
t* --- --- --- --- -0.000 -0.23 --- --- -0.000 -0.44
TAX
O-T-R
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.000 0.29 0.000 -0.27
Shape 1.756 29.58 *** 1.752 29.47 *** 1.756 29.62 *** 1.755 29.56 *** 1.763 29.47 ***
Observations 2825 2825 2825 2825 2825
Log Likelihood 1550 1538 1550 1549 1535
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The symbols ***, **, * indicate a statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The mean equation only reports one lag
of the dependent variable.












Definition of the tax: TAX
E-R  








Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig.
Equation for the mean of the return
Constant -0.004 -0.24 -0.000 -0.01 -0.005 -0.26 -0.004 -0.24 -0.004 -0.23
 e t-1 0.148 8.63 *** 0.144 8.39 *** 0.148 8.61 *** 0.151 8.81 *** 0.145 8.50 ***
 spread t 0.023 8.60 *** 0.019 6.85 *** 0.023 8.60 *** 0.024 8.69 *** 0.019 6.98 ***
vix t 0.002 2.18 ** 0.001 2.05 ** 0.002 2.20 ** 0.002 2.28 ** 0.002 2.33 **
 Dif t -0.000 -0.23 -0.000 -0.01 -0.000 -0.24 -0.000 -1.08 -0.000 -1.13
TAX
E-R
t -0.027 -1.50 -0.023 -1.36 -0.025 -0.76 -0.034 -1.90 * -0.024 -0.66
0.001 0.14 -0.001 -0.21 0.001 0.14 0.001 0.19 0.000 0.12
 pc t -0.040 -6.80 *** -0.039 -6.70 *** -0.040 -6.78 *** -0.040 -6.81 *** -0.038 -6.54 ***
Dq t- 1 -0.003 -3.00 *** -0.003 -3.09 *** -0.003 -3.01 *** -0.003 -3.15 *** -0.003 -3.18 ***
TAX
E-R
t* spread t --- --- 0.040 7.03 *** --- --- --- --- 0.042 7.40 ***
TAX
E-R
t* --- --- --- --- -0.002 -0.08 --- --- -0.007 -0.24
TAX
E-R
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.002 2.14 ** 0.002 2.31 **
Equation for the variance of the return
a 0.190 10.76 *** 0.191 10.62 *** 0.190 10.72 *** 0.189 10.71 *** 0.191 10.61 ***
b 0.810 45.99 *** 0.809 45.06 *** 0.810 45.70 *** 0.811 45.83 *** 0.809 44.87 ***
| spread t| 0.003 3.16 *** 0.003 2.83 *** 0.003 3.12 *** 0.003 3.08 *** 0.003 2.85 ***
vix t -0.000 -0.08 0.000 0.03 -0.000 -0.07 -0.000 -0.08 0.000 0.07
| Dif t| 0.000 0.93 0.000 0.88 0.000 0.92 0.000 0.88 0.000 0.89
TAX
E-R
t 0.011 2.14 ** 0.011 2.23 ** 0.012 1.21 0.010 1.77 * 0.015 1.32
-0.000 -0.82 -0.000 -0.83 -0.000 -0.78 -0.000 -0.81 -0.000 -0.86
| pc t| -0.002 -1.38 -0.001 -1.01 -0.002 -1.32 -0.001 -1.26 -0.001 -1.10
TAX
E-R
t* spread t --- --- -0.001 -0.15 --- --- --- --- -0.002 -0.43
TAX
E-R
t* --- --- --- --- -0.001 -0.22 --- --- -0.002 -0.32
TAX
E-R
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.000 0.24 0.000 -0.40
Shape 1.755 29.68 *** 1.748 29.48 *** 1.755 29.64 *** 1.756 29.63 *** 1.758 29.46 ***
Observations 2825 2825 2825 2825 2825
Log Likelihood 1551 1534 1551 1548 1531
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The symbols ***, **, * indicate a statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The mean equation only reports one lag
of the dependent variable.












Definition of the tax: TAX
d     
Sample 3:  2004:01:01 - 2010:07:30 







Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig.
Equation for the mean of the return
Constant 0.010 0.40 0.011 0.42 0.009 0.37 0.009 0.35 0.010 0.41
 e t-1 0.123 5.62 *** 0.128 5.90 *** 0.125 5.67 *** 0.126 5.78 *** 0.129 5.96 ***
 spread t 0.048 12.25 *** 0.038 9.33 *** 0.048 12.29 *** 0.048 12.34 *** 0.038 9.46 ***
vix t 0.000 0.29 0.000 0.31 0.000 0.29 0.000 0.36 0.000 0.27
 Dif t 0.000 -0.43 -0.000 -0.32 -0.000 -0.41 -0.000 -0.84 -0.000 -0.95
TAX
d
t -0.017 -0.50 -0.022 -0.64 -0.052 -0.62 -0.035 -1.02 -0.077 -0.91
0.002 0.82 0.003 0.90 0.002 0.78 0.002 0.83 0.003 0.91
 pc t -0.051 -6.86 *** -0.049 -6.65 *** -0.051 -6.86 *** -0.051 -6.90 *** -0.047 -6.52 ***
Dq t- 1 -0.004 -1.97 ** -0.004 -2.11 ** -0.004 -1.90 * -0.004 -1.95 * -0.004 -1.97 **
TAX
d
t* spread t --- --- 0.060 5.27 *** --- --- --- --- 0.062 5.44 ***
TAX
d
t* --- --- --- --- 0.025 0.43 --- --- 0.026 0.45
TAX
d
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.003 1.65 * 0.003 1.81 *
Equation for the variance of the return
a 0.179 7.98 *** 0.175 8.00 *** 0.177 7.93 *** 0.178 7.93 *** 0.173 8.02 ***
b 0.821 36.48 *** 0.825 37.82 *** 0.823 36.85 *** 0.822 36.66 *** 0.827 38.42 ***
| spread t| 0.002 1.09 0.001 0.70 0.002 1.13 0.002 1.08 0.001 0.80
vix t 0.000 0.95 0.000 0.95 0.000 0.93 0.000 0.93 0.000 0.96
| Dif t| 0.000 0.72 0.000 0.86 0.000 0.70 0.000 0.70 0.000 0.87
TAX
d
t 0.017 1.77 * 0.019 1.98 ** -0.030 -0.46 0.015 1.39 -0.011 -0.17
0.000 -0.83 -0.000 -0.57 -0.000 -0.85 -0.000 -0.82 -0.000 -0.58
| pc t| -0.002 -0.84 -0.002 -0.73 -0.002 -0.85 -0.002 -0.80 -0.002 -0.91
TAX
d
t* spread t --- --- 0.000 0.01 --- --- --- --- -0.000 -0.01
TAX
d
t* --- --- --- --- 0.033 0.68 --- --- 0.022 0.46
TAX
d
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.000 0.17 -0.001 -0.26
Shape 1.702 20.56 *** 1.687 20.59 *** 1.704 20.55 *** 1.708 20.48 *** 1.705 20.45 ***
Observations 1717 1717 1717 1717 1717
Log Likelihood 1237 1229 1236 1235 1226
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The symbols ***, **, * indicate a statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The mean equation only reports one lag
of the dependent variable.





















Definition of the tax: TAX
O-T-R 









Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig.
Equation for the mean of the return
Constant 0.010 0.41 0.010 0.41 * 0.009 0.36 0.009 0.36 0.010 0.41
 e t-1 0.123 5.63 *** 0.127 5.84 *** 0.124 5.67 *** 0.126 5.76 *** 0.129 5.98 ***
 spread t 0.048 12.25 *** 0.038 9.40 *** 0.048 12.26 *** 0.048 12.33 *** 0.038 9.50 ***
vix t 0.000 0.26 0.000 0.33 0.000 0.29 0.000 0.35 0.000 0.25
 Dif t -0.000 -0.43 -0.000 -0.27 -0.000 -0.42 -0.000 -0.84 -0.000 -0.95
TAX
O-T-R
t -0.001 -0.43 -0.002 -0.67 -0.004 -0.62 -0.002 -0.98 -0.006 -0.96
0.002 0.83 0.003 0.92 0.002 0.82 0.002 0.83 0.003 0.91
 pc t -0.051 -6.86 *** -0.049 -6.65 *** -0.050 -6.85 *** -0.051 -6.90 *** -0.047 -6.49 ***
Dq t- 1 -0.004 -1.97 ** -0.004 -2.11 ** -0.004 -1.91 * -0.004 -1.97 ** -0.004 -1.97 **
TAX
O-T-R
t* spread t --- --- 0.004 5.25 *** --- --- --- --- 0.004 5.30 ***
TAX
O-T-R
t* --- --- --- --- 0.002 0.47 --- --- 0.002 0.53
TAX
O-T-R
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.000 1.70 * 0.000 1.75 *
Equation for the variance of the return
a 0.179 7.97 *** 0.175 7.98 *** 0.177 7.97 *** 0.178 7.92 *** 0.172 7.99 ***
b 0.821 36.48 *** 0.825 37.75 *** 0.823 37.16 *** 0.822 36.62 *** 0.828 38.38 ***
| spread t| 0.002 1.09 0.001 0.71 0.002 1.14 0.002 1.09 0.001 0.81
vix t 0.000 0.95 0.000 0.95 0.000 0.95 0.000 0.93 0.000 0.95
| Dif t| 0.000 0.73 0.000 0.86 0.000 0.72 0.000 0.70 0.000 0.87
TAX
O-T-R
t 0.001 1.77 * 0.001 1.97 ** -0.002 -0.46 0.001 1.37 -0.001 -0.21
-0.000 -0.83 -0.000 -0.58 -0.000 -0.84 -0.000 -0.81 -0.000 -0.57
| pc t| -0.002 -0.84 -0.002 -0.74 -0.002 -0.91 -0.002 -0.82 -0.002 -0.92
TAX
O-T-R
t* spread t --- --- 0.000 0.08 --- --- --- --- 0.000 0.10
TAX
O-T-R
t* --- --- --- --- 0.002 0.68 --- --- 0.002 0.50
TAX
O-T-R
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.000 0.10 0.000 -0.32
Shape 1.702 20.57 *** 1.687 20.59 *** 1.705 20.59 *** 1.708 20.48 *** 1.703 20.44 ***
Observations 1717 1717 1717 1717 1717
Log Likelihood 1237 1229 1236 1235 1227
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The symbols ***, **, * indicate a statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The mean equation only reports one lag
of the dependent variable.












Definition of the tax: TAX
O-T-R 
Sample 3:  2004:01:01 - 2010:07:30 







Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig.
Equation for the mean of the return
Constant 0.011 0.42 0.013 0.52 0.010 0.40 0.011 0.44 0.012 0.48
 e t-1 0.124 5.65 *** 0.128 5.91 *** 0.126 5.73 *** 0.128 5.86 *** 0.130 6.04 ***
 spread t 0.048 12.24 *** 0.036 9.00 *** 0.048 12.27 *** 0.048 12.28 *** 0.037 9.22 ***
vix t 0.000 0.23 0.000 0.12 0.000 0.23 0.000 0.28 0.000 0.20
 Dif t -0.000 -0.43 -0.000 -0.29 -0.000 -0.41 -0.000 -0.90 -0.000 -1.05
TAX
E-R
t -0.007 -0.39 -0.006 -0.29 -0.036 -0.82 -0.019 -1.01 -0.032 -0.74
0.002 0.83 0.003 0.92 0.002 0.78 0.002 0.81 0.003 0.93
 pc t -0.051 -6.88 *** -0.048 -6.67 *** -0.051 -6.89 *** -0.051 -6.92 *** -0.048 -6.59 ***
Dq t- 1 -0.004 -1.96 ** -0.004 -2.10 ** -0.004 -1.90 * -0.004 -2.00 ** -0.004 -2.03 **
TAX
E-R
t* spread t --- --- 0.037 6.17 *** --- --- --- --- 0.037 6.22 ***
TAX
E-R
t* --- --- --- --- 0.020 0.65 --- --- 0.009 0.29
TAX
E-R
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.002 1.99 ** 0.002 2.09 **
Equation for the variance of the return
a 0.180 7.99 *** 0.177 8.14 *** 0.178 7.94 *** 0.178 7.94 *** 0.179 8.11 ***
b 0.820 36.53 *** 0.823 37.80 *** 0.822 36.71 *** 0.822 36.68 *** 0.821 37.30 ***
| spread t| 0.002 1.07 0.001 0.64 0.002 1.10 ** 0.002 1.06 0.001 0.69
vix t 0.000 0.96 0.000 1.00 0.000 0.94 0.000 0.93 0.000 1.02
| Dif t| 0.000 0.70 0.000 0.89 0.000 0.69 *** 0.000 0.68 0.000 0.88
TAX
E-R
t 0.009 1.77 * 0.011 1.94 * -0.015 -0.44 * 0.009 1.41 0.006 0.18
-0.000 -0.84 -0.000 -0.56 -0.000 -0.85 -0.000 -0.82 -0.000 -0.57
| pc t| -0.002 -0.80 -0.002 -0.74 -0.002 -0.81 -0.002 -0.78 -0.002 -0.81
TAX
E-R
t* spread t --- --- -0.002 -0.55 --- --- --- --- -0.004 -0.70
TAX
E-R
t* --- --- --- --- 0.018 0.69 --- --- 0.005 0.18
TAX
E-R
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.000 0.07 -0.001 -0.52
Shape 1.700 20.57 *** 1.683 20.64 *** 1.702 20.55 *** 1.704 20.44 *** 1.867 46.48 ***
Observations 1717 1717 1717 1717 1717
Log Likelihood 1237 1225 1236 1234 1222
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The symbols ***, **, * indicate a statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The mean equation only reports one lag
of the dependent variable.












Definition of the tax: TAX
d  
Sample 4:  2008:01:01 - 2010:07:30  






Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig.
Equation for the mean of the return
Constant 0.062 0.76 0.052 0.65 0.071 0.85 0.074 0.90 0.071 0.88
 e t-1 0.140 3.91 *** 0.127 3.60 *** 0.131 3.61 *** 0.145 4.11 *** 0.125 3.54 ***
 spread t 0.075 7.70 *** 0.086 7.43 *** 0.076 7.87 *** 0.074 7.69 *** 0.090 7.71 ***
vix t -0.004 -1.11 -0.003 -1.07 -0.003 -0.80 -0.004 -1.24 -0.003 -0.84
 Dif t -0.005 -1.67 * -0.006 -1.90 * -0.004 -1.41 -0.001 -0.13 0.000 0.08
TAX
d
t -0.015 -0.25 -0.015 -0.26 -0.055 -0.87 -0.014 -0.24 -0.054 -0.88
I t 0.036 1.12 0.035 1.10 -0.003 -0.09 0.031 0.97 -0.009 -0.24
 pc t -0.158 -8.69 *** -0.145 -7.97 *** -0.150 -8.32 *** -0.164 -9.12 *** -0.142 -7.97 ***
Dq t- 1 -0.000 -0.02 0.001 0.10 -0.004 -0.54 0.000 0.05 -0.004 -0.46
TAX
d
t* spread t --- --- -0.037 -1.79 * --- --- --- --- -0.046 -2.22 **
TAX
E-R
t*I t --- --- --- --- 0.155 2.03 ** --- --- 0.160 2.13 **
TAX
d
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.008 -1.21 -0.008 -1.28
Equation for the variance of the return
a 0.185 3.97 *** 0.185 3.83 *** 0.197 3.89 *** 0.185 3.93 *** 0.203 3.73 ***
b 0.815 17.50 *** 0.815 16.82 *** 0.803 15.81 *** 0.815 17.25 *** 0.797 14.64 ***
| spread t| 0.005 0.57 0.005 0.53 0.007 0.68 0.005 0.57 0.007 0.67
vix t -0.000 -0.23 -0.000 -0.26 * -0.000 -0.12 -0.000 -0.01 -0.000 -0.03
| Dif t| -0.001 -0.21 -0.001 -0.22 -0.000 -0.11 -0.000 -0.06 0.000 0.00
TAX
d
t 0.007 0.26 0.010 0.36 0.002 0.07 0.014 0.51 0.008 0.27
I t -0.000 -0.06 -0.000 -0.01 -0.003 -0.30 -0.002 -0.21 -0.003 -0.35
| pc t| 0.021 0.67 0.022 0.72 0.017 0.53 0.012 0.41 0.014 0.43
TAX
d
t* spread t --- --- 0.013 0.55 --- --- --- --- 0.007 0.30
TAX
E-R
t*I t --- --- --- --- 0.022 0.52 --- --- 0.022 0.48
TAX
d
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.009 -1.16 -0.007 -0.90
Shape 1.659 11.37 *** 1.706 11.41 *** 1.666 11.50 *** 1.656 11.24 *** 1.727 11.72 ***
Observations 674 674 674 674 674
Log Likelihood 765 763 762 764 759
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The symbols ***, **, * indicate a statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The mean equation only reports one lag
of the dependent variable.




Definition of the tax: TAX
E-R  
Sample 4:  2008:01:01 - 2010:07:30  







Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig.
Equation for the mean of the return
Constant 0.062 0.77 0.051 0.65 0.072 0.86 0.074 0.90 0.073 0.90
 e t-1 0.140 3.92 *** 0.127 3.61 *** 0.131 3.61 *** 0.145 4.11 *** 0.126 3.57 ***
 spread t 0.075 7.70 *** 0.087 7.41 *** 0.076 7.88 *** 0.074 7.71 *** 0.090 7.73 ***
vix t -0.004 -1.12 -0.003 -1.07 -0.003 -0.80 -0.004 -1.23 -0.003 -0.86
 Dif t -0.005 -1.67 * -0.006 -1.90 * -0.004 -1.38 0.000 -0.08 0.001 0.11
TAX
O-T-R
t -0.001 -0.26 -0.001 -0.27 -0.004 -0.87 -0.001 -0.20 -0.003 -0.84
I t 0.036 1.13 0.035 1.10 -0.003 -0.09 0.031 0.95 -0.009 -0.25
 pc t -0.158 -8.71 *** -0.145 -7.98 *** -0.150 -8.32 *** -0.164 -9.08 *** -0.141 -7.97 ***
Dq t- 1 0.000 -0.02 0.001 0.09 -0.004 -0.54 0.000 0.05 -0.004 -0.46
TAX
O-T-R
t* spread t --- --- -0.002 -1.82 * --- --- --- --- -0.003 -2.27 **
TAX
E-R
t*I t --- --- --- --- 0.010 1.97 ** --- --- 0.010 2.13 **
TAX
O-T-R
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.001 -1.24 -0.001 -1.37
Equation for the variance of the return
a 0.185 3.96 *** 0.185 3.81 *** 0.197 3.88 *** 0.185 3.94 *** 0.201 3.72 ***
b 0.815 17.49 *** 0.815 16.85 *** 0.803 15.83 *** 0.815 17.36 *** 0.799 14.80 ***
| spread t| 0.005 0.57 0.005 0.53 0.007 0.67 0.005 0.54 0.007 0.63
vix t 0.000 -0.23 0.000 -0.26 0.000 -0.13 0.000 -0.05 0.000 -0.04
| Dif t| -0.001 -0.21 -0.001 -0.23 0.000 -0.10 0.000 0.07 0.000 0.11
TAX
O-T-R
t 0.000 0.25 0.001 0.38 0.000 0.06 0.001 0.51 0.001 0.32
I t 0.000 -0.06 0.000 -0.01 -0.003 -0.30 -0.002 -0.21 -0.003 -0.34
| pc t| 0.020 0.66 0.022 0.71 0.017 0.53 0.012 0.41 0.013 0.41
TAX
O-T-R
t* spread t --- --- 0.001 0.58 --- --- --- --- 0.001 0.38
TAX
E-R
t*I t --- --- --- --- 0.001 0.52 --- --- 0.001 0.45
TAX
O-T-R
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.001 -1.23 -0.001 -1.05
Shape 1.660 11.36 *** 1.706 11.41 *** 1.666 11.49 *** 1.651 11.22 *** 1.728 11.72 ***
Observations 674 674 674 674 674
Log Likelihood 765 763 762 764 759
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The symbols ***, **, * indicate a statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The mean equation only reports one lag
of the dependent variable.




Definition of the tax: TAX
O-T-R  
Sample 4:  2008:01:01 - 2010:07:30  
 
 




Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig. Coeff. t Sig.
Equation for the mean of the return
Constant 0.065 0.80 0.056 0.70 0.071 0.86 0.075 0.92 0.076 0.94
 e t-1 0.140 3.94 *** 0.127 3.60 *** 0.131 3.61 *** 0.142 4.03 *** 0.128 3.60 ***
 spread t 0.075 7.67 *** 0.085 7.34 *** 0.076 7.85 *** 0.074 7.68 *** 0.086 7.48 ***
vix t -0.004 -1.14 -0.004 -1.12 -0.003 -0.84 -0.004 -1.26 -0.003 -0.89
 Dif t -0.005 -1.68 * -0.006 -1.99 ** -0.005 -1.47 -0.002 -0.37 -0.001 -0.20
TAX
E-R
t -0.015 -0.32 -0.013 -0.29 -0.042 -0.82 -0.012 -0.25 -0.041 -0.83
I t 0.037 1.15 0.037 1.14 0.000 0.00 0.032 1.01 -0.006 -0.16
 pc t -0.159 -8.76 *** -0.145 -8.04 *** -0.151 -8.37 *** -0.164 -9.14 *** -0.145 -8.14 ***
Dq t- 1 0.000 -0.01 0.001 0.11 -0.004 -0.49 0.001 0.07 -0.004 -0.47
TAX
E-R
t* spread t --- --- -0.028 -1.76 * --- --- --- --- -0.029 -1.83 *
TAX
E-R
t*I t --- --- --- --- 0.124 2.00 ** --- --- 0.127 2.06 **
TAX
E-R
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.005 -1.01 -0.005 -1.11
Equation for the variance of the return
a 0.185 3.93 *** 0.187 3.84 *** 0.197 3.86 *** 0.186 3.88 *** 0.200 3.72 ***
b 0.815 17.34 *** 0.813 16.69 *** 0.803 15.71 *** 0.814 16.99 *** 0.800 14.89 ***
| spread t| 0.006 0.60 0.005 0.57 0.007 0.71 0.006 0.63 0.007 0.68
vix t 0.000 -0.15 0.000 -0.23 0.000 -0.02 0.000 0.13 0.000 0.15
| Dif t| -0.001 -0.37 -0.001 -0.32 -0.001 -0.29 -0.001 -0.36 -0.001 -0.26
TAX
E-R
t 0.009 0.42 0.010 0.42 0.006 0.26 0.017 0.78 0.012 0.52
I t 0.000 -0.05 0.000 0.00 -0.003 -0.30 -0.001 -0.19 -0.003 -0.32
| pc t| 0.019 0.63 0.022 0.71 0.014 0.47 0.010 0.34 0.010 0.31
TAX
E-R
t* spread t --- --- 0.009 0.48 --- --- --- --- 0.005 0.28
TAX
E-R
t*I t --- --- --- --- 0.019 0.54 --- --- 0.018 0.50
TAX
E-R
t* Dif t --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.006 -1.04 -0.005 -0.83
Shape 1.663 11.37 *** 1.702 11.41 *** 1.668 11.49 *** 1.662 11.23 *** 1.712 11.60 ***
Observations 674 674 674 674 674
Log Likelihood 765 763 762 764 760
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The symbols ***, **, * indicate a statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The mean equation only reports one lag
of the dependent variable.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5